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ABSTRACT 
 
Alaskan fisheries are steeped in centuries of tradition and decades of innovative 
management. The Pacific halibut fishery is the oldest fishery in the United States 
managed under an individual fishing quota (IFQ) system. As such, the Pacific halibut 
fishery serves as an ideal system to study the long-term impacts of an IFQ system. A 
frenzy of research focused on the system after its implementation in 1995, which created 
an excellent baseline. However, interest in the halibut fishery faded as other IFQ 
programs began popping up around the world. 
 Over two decades later, the Pacific halibut fishery remains understudied in its 
current, contemporary state. Additionally, the success of the management provisions put 
in place to safeguard the small-boat fleet has never been investigated. This research seeks 
to fill a gap in the literature by comparing contemporary results to initial studies on 
Pacific halibut IFQs and being the first to examine the safeguards. Specifically, it 
analyzes the social impacts of IFQs and uses the data gained to present management 
alternatives. Finally, these interviews brought to light a number of issues currently facing 
the IFQ system that were not addressed in the interview questions, but that subjects 
strongly felt needed to be included. 
 Using qualitative interview and survey methods, data were collected in the field 
over a three-month period in Sitka, AK in 2018. This thesis details the opinions of 
fishermen regarding the Pacific halibut IFQ program and the effectiveness of the 
management safeguards. It was found that subjects of this research study generally 
approve of IFQs, but that this approval seems to be linked to the participant’s role in the 
 iii 
 
fishery. There was overwhelming support for the management safeguards, but 
participants felt many could be improved. Finally, these interviews brought to light a 
number of issues currently facing the IFQ system including balloon effects on other 
fisheries, barriers to entry, climate change, and conflicts with other sectors.   
With the global dependence on ocean-sourced protein growing, it is essential to 
ensure resources are managed sustainably. Social management and sustainability are 
important facets of this and are imperative for the preservation of small, Alaskan, 
fisheries dependent, coastal communities.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Probably all the great sea-fisheries, are inexhaustible; that is to say, that nothing 
we do seriously affects the number of fish.”1 Thomas Huxley said this in his 1883 address 
to the Fishery Congress not knowing the vast impact his words would have on the future 
of fisheries management.2 Even today, over one hundred years later, some individuals 
still believe in the idea of the inexhaustibility of the seas. 
 Since 1883 there has been an incredible advance in technology and our ability to 
exploit natural resources has increased dramatically. Huxley’s statement no longer holds 
water and it is evident that the sea’s resources are unequivocally exhaustible. We now 
have many species that are in fact in dangerously overexploited. According to the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) most recent stock 
assessment in 2018, 41 stocks are overfished, and 30 stocks are on the overfishing list in 
the United States.3 As of 2018, the world’s population reached 7 billion and is estimated 
to rise to 10 billion by 2050.4 Currently, the global population consumes about 143.8 
                                                 
1 Huxley, T. H. 1883. Inaugural meeting of the fishery congress. Address delivered June 18, 1883, pp. 1-
40, at pg. 16. London. 
2 Worm, B., Hilborn, R., Baum, J.K., Branch, T.A., Collie, J.S., Costello, C., Fogarty, M.J., Fulton, E.A., 
Hutchings, J.A., Jennings, S., Jensen, O.P., Lotze, H.K., Mace, P.M., McClanahan, T.R., Minto, C., 
Palumbo, S.R., Parma, A.M., Ricard, D., Rosenberg, A.A., Watson, R., Zeller, D. 2009. Rebuilding Global 
Fisheries. Science. 325(5940): 578-585. 
3 Fishery Stock Status Updates [Internet]. NOAA Fisheries; 2018 [cited 2019 March 30]. Available from 
https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/national/population-assessments/fishery-stock-status-updates 
4 Guillen, J., Natale, F., Carvalho, N., Casey, J., Hofherr, J., Druon, J.N., Fiore, G., Gibin, M., Zanzi, A., 
Martinsohn, J.T. 2018. Global seafood consumption footprint. Ambio. 48(2): 111-122. 
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million tonnes of seafood each year.5 To put this in perspective, capture fisheries and 
aquaculture make up 36% of the international food trade market, while meat only 
accounts for 10% of the global food market.6 Due to these facts, society now faces a time 
in which it has become crucial to sustainably and properly manage fisheries in order to 
ensure future food security. 
 As humans continue to fish down the food web and put excessive pressure on fish 
stocks, managers have turned to fisheries privatization as a go-to management technique 
for limiting exploitation. The popularization of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons and the 
mis-conceptualization of private property rights has led to the coupling of rights-based 
fisheries management with resource stewardship and stock sustainability.7 Additionally, 
oversight of the original intentions and timeline of limited entry parameters spelled out in 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) has 
resulted in the idea that limited entry schemes are cemented in place. As stated by 
Carothers (2010), “The widespread circulation of this discourse has created a fertile 
context for increased fishery privatization, not under the auspices of maximizing wealth 
capture as previously articulated, but for the conservation of depleted resources.”8 
 Federally managed fisheries off the state of Alaska serve as excellent case studies 
for the management of fishery effort. Fisheries management in Alaska is an extremely 
complex system influenced by different user groups, cultural traditions, economic 
                                                 
5 Guillen, J., Natale, F., Carvalho, N., Casey, J., Hofherr, J., Druon, J.N., Fiore, G., Gibin, M., Zanzi, A., 
Martinsohn, J.T. 2018. Global seafood consumption footprint. Ambio. 48(2): 111-122. 
6 I.d. 
7 Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science. 162(3859): 1243-1248. 
8 Carothers, C. 2010. Tragedy of Commodification: Transitions in Alutiiq Fishing Communities in the Gulf 
of Alaska. Maritime Studies. 90(2): 91-115, at pg. 95. 
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markets, management working groups, complicated ecological interactions, and 
community remoteness. Alaska’s fisheries are also an interesting case because Alaska is a 
place where fish stocks are relatively healthy and the management narrative is dominated 
by social management rather than ecological management.9 As stated by Carothers 
(2010) “In Alaska, where fish stocks remain generally healthy, the 
dominant narrative of the tragedy of the commons is not nearly as appropriate of a 
metaphor as is the tragedy of commodification (Greenberg 1998; Walley 2004), or the 
tragedy of the margins (Kleinen 2009). Privatizing the right to fish in Alaska has had 
fundamental impacts on the fishing lifestyle in remote coastal communities.”10,11,12,13 Due 
to the fact that fisheries are the heart of Alaska’s small coastal communities, it is 
extremely important to ensure the resource is properly managed both environmentally 
and socially. As a result, it is imperative that we as a society consider the effects of 
fisheries management and rights-allocation of Alaska’s halibut fishery have had on 
vulnerable individuals and communities. 
 In this paper, utilizing data gathered from previous and current participants of 
Alaska’s halibut fishery, I analyze the social impacts the IFQ fishery has had over the last 
two decades on an individual and community level. The data that was gathered is 
compared to previous data that was collected before and directly after the program 
                                                 
9 Carothers, C. 2010. Tragedy of Commodification: Transitions in Alutiiq Fishing Communities in the Gulf 
of Alaska. Maritime Studies. 90(2): 91-115. 
10 I.d., at pg. 96. 
11 Greenburg, J. 1998. The tragedy of commoditization: The political ecology of the Colorado River Delta’s 
destruction. Research in Economic Anthropology. 19: 133-149. 
12 Walley, C. 2004. Rough Waters: Nature and Development in an East African Marine Park. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
13 Kleinen, J. 2009. Tragedy of the margins: Land rights and marginality in Vietnam. Amsterdam: Paper 
presented at the People of the Sea V, Maritime Research Centre. 
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initially went into place. Additionally, the unique management safeguards used in the 
Alaska halibut IFQ fishery are also evaluated to expose the perceived successes and 
failures of these innovative restrictions. These interviews brought to light new, relevant 
issues facing the IFQ program. Due to the developed nature of the program, these issues 
have been culminating for some time and are at the forefront of IFQ controversy. As a 
result, the fishermen and researchers of this study felt strongly these issues were too 
important to omit. It is our hope that this research will be used to inform future fisheries 
management decisions and to demonstrate the social implications of such a program to 
those considering implementing new IFQ management plans. 
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PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Fisheries are the heart of small Alaskan communities’ welfare, culture, and 
economies. As a result, it is extremely important to ensure the resource is properly 
managed both environmentally and socially. The current literature lacks a holistic 
perspective on the social management of the Pacific Halibut IFQ fishery in Alaska. This 
research aimed to inclusively explore the opinions of current quota shareholders, 
crewmembers, and fishermen who have exited the industry concerning Pacific Halibut 
IFQs. More specifically, this study examined these participants’ contemporary opinions 
concerning the social impacts of the system, the success of the safeguards, and 
modifications that should be made to the current system. Additionally, this research 
identifies significant, new challenges facing the Pacific halibut IFQ program, which 
should guide future work. It is extremely important that these new challenges are 
recognized because, due to the age of the program, they are not necessarily experienced 
yet by younger IFQ programs. These new challenges include IFQ balloon effects, barriers 
to entry, evasion of safeguards, trawling, charter fleet reallocation, and climate change. 
Finally, I hope this research informs fisheries management groups looking to utilize IFQs 
in the future and encourage them to consider the social impacts of such a program.
 6 
 
JUSTIFICATION FOR AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
IFQ SATISFACTION 
 
Knapp (1997) studied the initial impacts of IFQs directly following their 
implementation in the Pacific Halibut fishery, but there has not been a follow-up study 
since that compares the initial impacts with the modern-day opinions of the program.14 
This study uncovered the current impacts of the IFQ system and compared them to the 
initial impacts and opinions of IFQs found by Knapp in 1996 and 1997.15 However, this 
research differs from Knapp’s studies because these methods deployed a more inclusive 
approach to expose marginalized groups’ opinions. Knapp’s study in 1996 included only 
longline captains and the proceeding 1997 study included only quota shareholders. This 
project aims to survey not just current quota shareholders, but also crewmembers and 
fishermen who have exited the halibut industry. 
 Knapp (1996) surveyed longline captains before IFQs were implemented in order 
to gauge acceptance of the program and found that those who thought they would receive 
quota preferred IFQs to other management techniques.16 This is presumably due to the 
economic gains associated with being awarded quota. Knapp (1996) found that “Support 
for IFQs was clearly related to whether or not captains expected their financial situation 
to improve with IFQs.”17  
                                                 
14 Knapp, G. 1997. Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments of Alaska 
Fishermen. Marine Resource Economics. 12(3): 239–248. 
15 I.d. 
16 Knapp, G. 1996. Alaska Halibut Captains’ Attitudes Towards IFQs. Marine Resource Economics. 11(1): 
43–55. 
17 I.d., at pg. 52. 
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 Knapp (1997) surveyed Pacific halibut quota holders to determine both positive 
and negative impacts of IFQs.18 It was determined that feelings towards the program were 
inversely correlated with how much quota each individual had.19 For example, those with 
more quota had positive attitudes towards the program and those with smaller amounts of 
quota were more likely to have a negative attitude towards IFQs.20 Overall Knapp (1997) 
found that an equal percentage of participants held positive, mixed, and negative attitudes 
towards IFQs.21  
There still remains an immense gap in the literature concerning the opinions of 
captains/vessel owners who were not awarded halibut quota and crewmembers (who 
inherently didn't get any quota) concerning the impacts of IFQ implementation. As a 
result, this study aims to explore IFQ satisfaction among a variety of stakeholders and to 
compare these contemporary results with the initial findings stated above.
                                                 
18 Knapp, G. 1997. Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments of Alaska 
Fishermen. Marine Resource Economics. 12(3): 239–248. 
19 I.d. 
20 I.d. 
21 I.d. 
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EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFEGUARDS 
 
 There is a significant gap in the literature concerning the success of the safeguards 
put in place to mitigate the adverse impacts of the Pacific Halibut IFQ program. Nothing 
in the literature suggests coverage of this issue at all. Reportedly, some fishermen in 
Knapp’s 1996 survey suggested changes for or commented on the block plan and 
ownership limits, but this was not elaborated on at all in the study.22 Currently, there is a 
debate taking place over the safeguards in the Pacific Halibut IFQ management scheme 
and whether or not they are necessary or need to be improved upon. This research aimed 
to inclusively explore the opinions of current quota shareholders, crewmembers, and 
fishermen who have exited the industry, concerning the perceived success of the 
safeguards in the Pacific Halibut IFQ fishery and if modifications should be made 
moving forward. 
                                                 
22 Knapp, G. 1997. Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments of Alaska 
Fishermen. Marine Resource Economics. 12(3): 239–248. 
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CASE STUDY FOR OTHER FISHERIES 
 
Fisheries management in Alaska is deeply embedded in the culture of coastal 
communities. Specifically, halibut IFQ management is deeply rooted in coastal 
communities due to the age of the program. The maturity of the Pacific halibut 
management scheme and the high value of the resource makes the system an ideal case 
study for managers who are considering implementing IFQs in other fisheries. It is the 
intention of this research to serve as both an example and cautionary tale to fisheries 
managers. IFQs are not a magic bullet or cure-all, but they are a tool that can be 
successfully utilized by fisheries managers when implemented correctly and with caution. 
IFQs have compounding and lasting impacts, which can be mitigated by pairing the 
program with safeguards such as those in the Pacific Halibut fishery. This research 
should serve as a jumping off point to create a conversation surrounding the tradeoffs, 
challenges, and consequences of implementing a similar program in other fisheries.
  10 
CHAPTER 2 
 
HALIBUT 
 
Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) are the world’s largest flatfish species.23 
Pacific halibut are native to the North Pacific Ocean from Santa Barbara, CA to Nome, 
AK.24 Their diamond shaped bodies can grow in excess of 8 feet long, 5 feet wide, and 
weigh over 500 pounds.25 As adults, they are most commonly mottled dark brown to grey 
on their right side, which is contrasted by a stark white color on their left side. They are 
benthic fish and bury themselves in the sand in order to hide their white posterior plane, 
while their brown anterior plane blends with the benthos. As juveniles, halibut have an 
eye on both their anterior and posterior sides, but as they grow one eye migrates to the 
right side. At this point, halibut begin swimming sideways with both eyes on top of their 
heads.  
 Pacific halibut are long-lived species, with the oldest one recorded at 55 years 
old.26 As such, it takes a considerable amount of time for halibut to reach sexual maturity. 
Males reach sexual maturity at 5 years old and females at 12 years old.27 They spawn in 
deep water along the continental slope in the winter, mainly in the Bering Sea, Aleutian 
Islands, Gulf of Alaska, and sometimes as far south as British Columbia.28 Growth, 
                                                 
23 Pacific Halibut [Internet]. NOAA Fisheries, [cited 2019 Feb 09]. Available from 
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/species/pacific-halibut 
24 I.d. 
25 I.d. 
26 I.d. 
27 I.d. 
28 I.d. 
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development, and migration patterns must all be taken into account in order to foster 
successful management.   
 Native Alaskans have been subsistence fishing for halibut for centuries, but the 
Pacific halibut fishery didn't begin until the late 1800s.29,30 As word of the great 
abundance of halibut out west reached the east coast of North America, Gloucester-style 
schooner fishing vessels began to flood to the west coast.31 By 1900 most sailing 
schooners were outfitted with gas engines. This advancement in technology meant an 
increase in efficiency that allowed fishermen to travel beyond Southeast Alaska in search 
of halibut.32 Steamer fishing vessels dominated the halibut industry in Alaska until the 
1920s when it became clear that smaller vessels could deliver halibut more quickly.33 In 
1944 the first gear restriction for halibut was put in place, which banned the use of nets.34 
This transformed the commercial Pacific halibut fishing fleet into the longline industry 
we have today. Just as the industry evolved from sail to gasoline engine, the halibut 
fishery continued to expand as technological advances were made throughout history. 
Fishermen learned to become more efficient as equipment allowed their vessels and gear 
to become larger in size and scope, as well as more powerful and effective. Over time this 
excessive effort placed on the halibut fishery dwindled the season down from months to 
days and days to hours in order to retain a sustainable total allowable catch. Decreasing 
fishing windows lead to a race to catch as much fish as possible in a short amount of 
                                                 
29 Thompson, William F, and Norman L Freeman. History of the Pacific Halibut Fishery. Vol. 5, Wrigley 
Printing Co, 1930. 
30 Pacific Halibut Industry History [Internet]. Deming (WA): Halibut Association of North America; [cited 
2019 Feb 09]. Available from halibutassociation.org/history.html 
31 I.d. 
32 I.d. 
33 I.d. 
34 I.d. 
  12 
time, which created the iconic Pacific halibut derby fishery. The derby fishery, caused by 
an exponential increase in efficiency, resulted in a scramble to institute a management 
scheme to control it. 
  13 
HALIBUT AS A COMMON POOL RESOURCE 
 
The Pacific halibut fishery is much younger than the Atlantic halibut fishery.35 As 
the price for Atlantic halibut began to rise between 1820-1825 fishing pressure 
increased.36 Depletion of Atlantic halibut stocks and the development of the Northern 
Pacific Railway sparked interest in the discovery of a western substitute species.37 The 
deep-sea Pacific halibut fishery began in the last decade of the 19th century. Rising prices 
of Pacific halibut and expansion of technological capabilities led to input stuffing and 
increased exploitation.38 As the local stock became depleted, fishing vessels traveled 
farther and farther offshore to exploit the distant water stock.39 United States fishermen 
were competing with foreign fleets right up to Alaska’s coast until 1959.40 In 1959 
Alaska became a state, which established a state-managed zone around the coast 
extending to 3nm.41 In 1966, the passage of the Bartlett Act extended U.S. jurisdiction to 
12nm. However, this narrow area was not large enough to support the expanding U.S. 
commercial Pacific halibut fleet and competition beyond 12nm with foreign vessels 
continued until 1976. In 1976, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (MSFCMA) was passed, which restricted foreign fishing beyond 
200nm.42 With the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the state controls the fisheries 
                                                 
35 Cunningham, S. 2005. Successful Fisheries Management: Issues, Case Studies and Perspective. Eburon 
Academic Publishing, Delft, Netherlands. 
36 I.d. 
37 I.d. 
38 I.d. 
39 I.d. 
40 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council. https://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/ 
41 I.d. 
42 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801-1891, at pgs. 70-71 
(d)) 
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within 3nm and between 3-200nm is controlled by the federal government. As a result, 
the Pacific halibut fishery became a federally managed fishery. 
 The Pacific halibut fishery remained an open-access fishery from 1977-1994.43 
Open-access fostered a culture of adaptive fishing, which is fishing when income is 
necessary.44 In other words, flexibility in profession was possible, which allowed halibut 
to be harvested primarily for subsistence purposes and profit when necessary. This 
further allowed fishermen to remain diversified in their fishing practices. Due to the 
expansion of the U.S. fishing fleet, which was facilitated by governmental monetary 
incentives and capital stuffing, sustained halibut stocks began to change in the 1970s-
1980s.45 In the 1990s the Alaskan halibut stock began to seriously decline.46 In order to 
control effort, total allowable catch (TAC), limits and season length limits were put in 
place. Increased effort created “the race for fish” forcing the season to become shorter 
and shorter. In 1995 the Alaskan halibut season was only two days, exemplifying a derby 
fishery. The season opening date was announced months in advance without any possible 
consideration of weather. This forced vessels out in dangerous weather conditions. 
Further, during the 48 hours crews were trying to harvest as much halibut as possible. In 
order to do so, crews wouldn't sleep for 48 hours straight and vessels would deploy as 
much gear as possible even if they knew they wouldn't be able to retrieve it all, which led 
to ghost fishing. Vessels were overloading triggering stability issues and sinking. Halibut 
                                                 
43 Cunningham, S. 2005. Successful Fisheries Management: Issues, Case Studies and Perspective. Eburon 
Academic Publishing, Delft, Netherlands. 
44 Carothers, C. 2010. Tragedy of Commodification: Transitions in Alutiiq Fishing Communities in the 
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45 Cunningham, S. 2005. Successful Fisheries Management: Issues, Case Studies and Perspective. Eburon 
Academic Publishing, Delft, Netherlands. 
46 I.d. 
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were not properly cared for because ice and slush were jettisoned to accommodate more 
fish and fish were often not gutted or cleaned during the opener. All of these factors led 
to an extremely low poundage price for halibut and the loss of many fishermen at sea. 
 In 1973, Alaska’s state constitution was amended to allow for limited entry 
fisheries programs.47 In 1976, the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council 
(NPFMC) was established for the purpose of coastal fisheries management. The first, 
official motion in the NPFMC to institute individual fishing quotas (IFQs) for halibut was 
in 1991. After 14 years of deliberation on behalf of the council, IFQs were instituted in 
the Pacific halibut fishery in 1995. 
                                                 
47 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council. https://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/ 
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THE PARADOX OF THE COMMONS 
 
“The tragedy of the commons” was coined by Garrett Hardin in 1968 with the 
publication of his paper that focuses on the demise of common pool resources and 
exponentially rising populations.48 Almost a century after Huxley stated that the seas 
were inexhaustible, Hardin is arguing that the worlds resources are in fact finite.49,50 
Hardin argues that in a world where finite resources are shared by the many that rational 
individuals act within their own self-interests.51 Because the resource is shared by all, the 
individual gains all of the benefits from increasing their own exploitation, but the 
negative impacts of this increased exploitation are split between all of the users.52 In 
following with this logic, why wouldn't the individual continue to overexploit if rewards 
always outweigh the costs? In a situation where each rational individual utilizing the 
common resource uses this logic to act in self-interest, a tragedy of the commons is 
created.53 According to Hardin, “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”54 Hardin goes on to offer many solutions for 
solving problems created by commons by suggesting the creation of private property or 
keeping areas as public property, but allocating access to the public areas.55 Access, he 
                                                 
48 Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science. 162(3859): 1243-1248, 1244. 
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50 Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science. 162(3859): 1243-1248. 
51 I.d. 
52 I.d. 
53 I.d. 
54 I.d., at pg. 1244. 
55 I.d. 
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proposes, would be allocated by auction, merit, lottery, or first come first served.56 
Hardin also argues that in order for society to relinquish their “freedoms” and “rights” in 
the commons there must be a certain level of mutually agreed upon coercion.57 In other 
words, in a world with an exploding population, restricting the commons enhances 
freedom rather than confining it.58 This is where the paradox of the commons is created; 
allowing unrestricted access to the commons created the freedom to profit and breed, but 
these freedoms are eventually restricted due to over overexploitation generated by 
rational selfishness. However, it is important to remember that Hardin was using the logic 
explained above to build an argument for population control and “abandoning the 
commons in breeding.”59 
Regardless of Hardin’s intentions for the use of this logic, it has now been applied 
to many other common pool resources, including fisheries. In the 1970s a wave of 
privatization swept across U.S fisheries.  
 Before the 1970s fisheries were managed using traditional tools such as utilizing a 
total allowable catch (TAC), closed seasons, closed areas, vessel construction limitation, 
size limits, sex limits, and gear restrictions. The use of these traditional tools controls the 
quantity of fish removed from the commons. However, it does not effectively control the 
amount of individual effort placed upon the commons. At this point, fisheries 
management becomes more about managing human actions rather than the resource 
itself.  
                                                 
56 Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science. 162(3859): 1243-1248. 
57 I.d. 
58 I.d. 
59 I.d., at pg. 1248. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF IFQS 
 
Fisheries were essentially managed as open-access, common pool resources until 
the 1970s. After this time fisheries were managed under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), which was passed in 1976.60 The initial 
version of this act called on managers to use traditional tools to control fishing effort and 
preserve fisheries in conjunction with limited entry systems when vitally necessary. 
Limited access privileges were included in the act in hopes that they would reduce fishing 
effort, overfishing, and economic inefficiencies.61 It is believed that when individuals are 
given ownership over a resource it incentivizes them to responsibly fish and preserve the 
resource.62 However, it is not universally agreed upon that ownership creates 
stewardship.63 After all, as argued by Hardin, humans are rational beings that act in self-
regard.64  
 Exclusive fishing privileges in the form of catch shares are now present in 16 U.S. 
fisheries.65 There are many forms of limited access, but the new fad seems to be 
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs), which are also known as Individual Transferable 
Quotas (ITQs). IFQs essentially allocate fishing access to a privileged group of 
individuals. Fishing access is allocated in the form of catch shares or quota shares, which 
                                                 
60 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801-1891, at pgs. 70-71 
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are percentages of the TAC for a particular fishery. More specifically, IFQs are 
“allocations of fish harvesting quotas to individuals or firms, specifying that a certain 
amount of fish or shellfish of a certain species may be caught in a specific area during a 
specific time frame.”66 The initial allocation method assigns quota to shareholders. A 
popular way of doing this is basing initial allocations on catch history over a certain time 
period in a fishery. Depending on the trade rules quota can be leased or sold for profit by 
the shareholder.  
 The shift from open-access fisheries to exclusive output controls shifted a kin-
based lifestyle of subsistence and commercial fishing to a business lifestyle focused on 
profit generation.67 Output controls in the form of IFQs also cause a shift in values from 
making a living to generating wealth.68 According to Criddle and Macinko (2000) 
economists have largely abandoned input controls, especially after failed limited entry 
schemes in the 1970s.69 
 Before the 1970s Alaska and Canadian halibut fisheries were managed without 
access restrictions and were only limited by the timing of openings and a yearly TAC.70 
Discussion of IFQs for the Pacific halibut fleet began by the NPFMC in the 1970s. As a 
result, speculative fishing began in 1978, but the Pacific halibut IFQ program did not start 
until 1995.71 When this new management plan was implemented it was the largest fishery 
                                                 
66 Criddle, K.R., Macinko, S. 2000. A requiem for the IFQ in US fisheries? Marine Policy. 24: 461-469, at 
pg. 461. 
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68 I.d. 
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71 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
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in the U.S. in terms of participants to utilize IFQ management.72 Creating an IFQ fishery 
greatly extended the halibut season from a few days to a 6-month season that runs from 
March to November.73 
 Initial allocations of Pacific halibut shares were awarded to vessel owners and 
leaseholders in perpetuity based on fishing history.74 This was due to the fact that 
managers believed that vessel owners had risked the most effort and capital in the fishing 
industry.75 As a result, crewmembers, hired captains, and individuals who didn't fish in 
that period were not gifted any quota. Those who fished during the years of 1988, 1989, 
or 1990 received an initial allocation of quota.76 If eligible based on these three 
qualifying years, fishermen’s quota allocation was based on the best five of seven years 
from 1984 to 1990.77 The awarded quota share was transferrable; meaning that it could be 
bought, sold, and leased barring a few restrictions.78 In 1995, when the program began, a 
single 5,000lb quota share was worth $350,000.79 
All Pacific halibut quota shares are area specific, including areas, 2C (Southeast, 
AK), 3A (Central Gulf of Alaska), 3B (Western Gulf of Alaska), 4A (eastern Aleutians), 
4B (western Aleutians), 4C, (Bristol Bay around the Pribilofs), 4D (Bering Sea, Bering 
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75 I.d., at pg. 59378. 
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Strait, and Beaufort Sea), and 4E (Bristol Bay).80,81 Further, the following bounds were 
used to create the program82: 
1. Vessel categories: 
a. Vessel size is broken down based on catching and processing 
capabilities. The two major categories are freezer boats and catcher 
boats. Freezer boats have the ability to process and freeze at sea, 
compared to catcher boats, which use slush and ice to hold fish. 
Ultimately this impacts the length of trip each boat can take. 
Catcher quota is further divided into three subcategories based on 
length;  
o Freezer boats A-shares 
o Catcher boats >60ft B-shares 
o Catcher boats 35-60ft C-shares 
o Catcher boats <35ft D-shares 
2. Leasing and sale of shares: 
a. Freezer boat A-shares may be leased or sold to any other qualified 
person in the freezer category. 
b. Catcher vessel boats may lease up to 10% of their shares during the 
first three years of the program. Catcher vessel shares may only be 
sold to individuals who are, U.S. citizens, is a crewmember, is 
onboard when the fish are landed, and signs the fish ticket. Finally, 
corporations and partnerships may only buy catcher vessel quota if 
they received an initial allocation of shares.  
3. Ownership limits: 
a. Gulf of Alaska (GOA): Cannot own more than 1% of the total 
tonnage available for the GOA. 
b. Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands: Cannot own more than 1.5% of 
the total tonnage available for this area. 
c. All areas: or cannot own more than 0.5% of the tonnage available 
for all areas combined. 
4. Enforcement: 
a. All sales, transfers, or leasing must be approved by the U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce or his/her designee. 
b. No trawler can purchase fixed gear quota. 
c. Overages above 10% count against quota allotment for the next 
year. 
d. A debit card system will be used to log catch. 
e. Vessels must keep all legal-sized halibut (no high grading).  
                                                 
80 Fisheries Figures, Boundaries, Regulatory Areas, EFH and Critical Habitat [Internet]. Anchorage and 
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81 58 C.F.R. § 59343.215 1993, at pg. 59394. 
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5. CDQ development: 
a. Allotment to “disadvantaged Western Alaska Native 
communities.”83 
b. 20%-100% of the quota is set-aside in several smaller areas in the 
Bering Sea and Aleutians. 
 
Many of these restrictions and parameters vary from area to area; the focus of this study 
was on area 2C, Southeast Alaska. 
 The bounds stated above were initially laid out before the start of the program but 
were restructured in the 1990s. The first change occurred in 1993 and is referred to as the 
“Block Plan,” or amendment 31.84 The block plan was put in place to slow, prevent, and 
mediate consolidation of large blocks of quota. Initial allocations greater than 20,000lbs 
would remain as regular, freely divisible quota shares, but those that were issued as less 
than 20,000lbs would become quota share blocks.85 Additionally, any quota shares less 
than 1,000lbs could be “swept up” or combined to form larger blocks up to 1,000lbs.86 
Finally, quota shareholders could own up to two blocks in one management area (this has 
since increased to three blocks).87 The Block Plan became effective at the onset of the 
program, in 1995.88 
 In 1996 the IFQ program was further refined with the “Buydown Amendment,” or 
amendment 42/42.89 The Buydown Amendment stated that catcher vessels’ quota shares 
can be used on vessels of the same class or smaller. This means that in all areas except 
2C, B-shares can be fished on C-class vessels and C-shares can be fished on D-class 
                                                 
83 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
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vessels. In area 2C, B-class buy down is only allowed for quota share blocks less than 
5,000lbs.90 This broadens the potential quota pool for vessels in smaller size classes. 
 In 1996, the amount of quota that could be swept up in the IFQ program changed. 
Previously it was set at less than 1,000lbs, but has since been increased to 3,000lbs.91 
This was done in order to create “economically fishable” blocks.92 In other words, 
fishermen felt that the cost associated with fishing smaller blocks did not outweigh the 
profits from small blocks. However, increasing block size increases profit with minimal 
increases to operating costs. 
 In 1999 the IFQ program was modified in order to specify requirements for hired 
skippers. This modification required the quota shareholder to invest in a portion of the 
boat if they did not wish to be on board during fishing operations. There was originally 
no minimum ownership interest set, but in 1999 an ownership minimum was set at 20% 
of the vessel their quota was being fished on.93 In 2014, this was further amended to 
include a 12-month requirement for the minimum 20% vessel ownership interest.94 Also 
in 2014, a clause was added stating that initial quota share recipients could not fish 
catcher boat-derived quota with hired masters that had been transferred after February 
12th, 2010.95 The amendments stated above were a direct response to the halibut fleet’s 
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increased reliance on hired masters.96 An increase in hired masters is potentially 
devastating to the fleet because it decreases quota turnover making entrance more 
difficult and creates a disconnect between the major industry profiteers and the 
fishermen.  
 The IFQ program has been amended over time, but the goal of the program has 
remained relatively constant. Some of the intended outcomes of the development of IFQs 
were decreased gear conflicts, decreased ghost fishing from lost gear, increased safety, 
increased season length, improvement of product quality, and increased product value.97 
Although not stated, these outcomes are direct resultants of fleet consolidation. 
According to Pautzke and Oliver (1997), in order to determine if IFQ development is 
appropriate in a certain fishery the following things must be considered, fair and 
equitable initial allocation, social and economic costs and benefits, and creation and 
comparison of the value of IFQs to the per pound price of the resource.98 In the case of 
the Pacific halibut IFQ program, the initial allocation was discriminating and imbalanced, 
the social costs were extremely high but considered insignificant, and quota price has far 
surpassed that of the dock price for halibut. For example, in the first year of the program 
the ex-vessel price was $2.01/lb. and the quota price was $11.77/lb., but in 2014 the ex-
vessel price was $6.07/lb. and the quota price was $44.29/lb. 
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 In conclusion, some of the most important features of the program to note are 
initial gifting of quota in perpetuity, transferability of quota, and the permitting of leasing 
activity. In area 2C specifically, as well as in other management areas, many safeguards 
have been put in place to combat the notorious consequences of the Pacific halibut IFQ 
system.  
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HALIBUT MANAGEMENT 
 
Development, enforcement, monitoring, and amending of the Pacific halibut IFQ 
program requires the effort and coordination of many different working groups. Due to 
the expansiveness and value of Alaska’s resources, these relationships cross state and 
national boundaries. 
 The state of Alaska has the highest commercial landings in the United States.99 
Pacific halibut is the fourth most valuable fishery in Alaska.100 User groups of the Pacific 
Halibut fishery in Southeast Alaska include Alaskan Natives from the Tlingit Tribe, 
Alaskan citizens, and various fishermen from the lower forty-eight. Southeast Alaska has 
a rich fishing history that dates back thousands of years to when the Tlingit Tribe is 
believed to have arrived in Sitka, AK.101 Tlingit translates to “people of the tides.”102 
Much of the tribe was and still is dependent on halibut and other fish for subsistence and 
livelihood.103 Sitka is still home to a large population of Tlingit Natives who continue to 
struggle for fishing rights as they are managed jointly with other commercial fishermen. 
 The International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC), the North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council (NPFMC), Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC), and the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) are responsible for managing the Pacific 
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halibut stock.104 The IPHC was established in 1953 and was mainly responsible for 
managing Pacific halibut until the late 1970s.105 The IPHC is a coordinated effort 
between the United States and Canada. In 1979, due to extended jurisdiction in 1976, the 
IPHC shifted its focus away from direct management, but continued to mainly oversee 
biological management of the resource.106 Currently, the IPHC is mainly responsible for 
using the latest scientific information to set harvest limits and to make recommendations 
to the NPFMC regarding season length and minimum size requirements.107 
 The NPFMC is one of eight regional management councils responsible for 
managing the United States’ coastal fisheries. The NPFMC is unique because it only 
oversees the management of fisheries off a single state’s coast (Alaska).108 However, 
Washington and Oregon interests are represented by voting members on the council. The 
NPFMC consists of 3 Washington, 1 Oregon, 6 Alaska, and 1 NMFS voting members.109 
These members work closely with a 13-member scientific and statistical committee and a 
24-member industry advisory panel.110 All members of the NPFMC are required to 
disclose any related financial interests held by themselves, their spouse, children, or 
organization they are associated with.111 The Northern Pacific Halibut Act of 1982 
delegated all decisions concerning limited entry and allocation to the Pacific Fishery 
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Management Council (PFMC) and NPFMC.112 Beyond this, the main responsibility of 
the NPFMC is to recommend management actions for fisheries in the EEZ to the U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce.113 For waters off the U.S. west coast the, PFMC is responsible 
for allocating catch limits and developing regulations that align with recommendations 
from the IPHC. 
 In area 2C and specifically in Sitka Sound, NMFS implemented a Local Area 
Management Plan (LAMP).114 The Sitka Sound LAMP is intended to eliminate 
competition for Pacific halibut between commercial and subsistence users.115 The LAMP 
bars commercial and charter operations from fishing inside Sitka Sound.116 
These working groups and regulations are responsible for managing the 
interactions between many different user groups all seeking to utilize the same resource 
off the coast of Alaska. All in all, the NPFMC is responsible for allocating catch and 
establishing regulations that align with the scientifically-backed recommendations of the 
IPHC, whilst NMFS is responsible for implementing and enforcing these regulations.117
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SITKA, A FISHING TOWN 
 
Sitka is a small coastal town on Baranof Island, located on the panhandle of 
Southeast Alaska. Sitka is home to about 9,000 people and supports a large Native 
Alaskan population (about 16%).118 
 Sitka has a small-town feel created by small streets, family-run shops, and a 
welcoming community. The waterfront is relatively commercialized to support a locally 
based fishing fleet and a massive influx of tourists shuttled in from cruise ships anchored 
in the sound. As you move inland from the waterfront, paved roads turn to dirt, the 
business district becomes neighborhoods and the neighborhoods back up against large 
mountains heavily traveled by hikers and grizzly bears. Sitka is located in the heart of the 
world’s largest temperate rainforest, the Tongass National Forrest. 
 Sitka is only accessible by boat or plane, isolating it from the closest large city, 
Juneau. It is also strategically situated on the outskirts of the Inside Passage, which 
explains its rich history dotted with military occupation. As you walk down the main strip 
in Sitka the Russian presence is still very dominant and projected in the form of Russian 
doll shops, fur shops, and the large Russian Orthodox Cathedral that anchors the center of 
town. If one takes to the water, they will also notice multiple concrete bunkers and 
lookouts speckled around Sitka on its small surrounding islands. These concrete 
structures were used as lookout points in World War II for armed Japanese submarines.  
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 Sitka supports a large fishing fleet consisting of over 2,000 registered vessels, 
making it the largest small boat fleet in Alaska.119 Of these 2,000 vessels, 632 are 
commercial fishing vessels.120 Sitka is located in halibut management area 2C, but some 
boats based out of Sitka hold permits to also fish outside of area 2C. These boats 
participate in a diverse set of fisheries including King salmon, Coho salmon, Sockeye 
salmon, Pink salmon, Chum salmon, sablefish, halibut, spot prawns, lingcod, rockfish, 
etc. According to NOAA, commercial fishing engagement and reliance is high in Sitka, 
as well as recreational fishing engagement.121 According to the Alaska Department of 
Fish and Game (ADFG), commercial fishing supports the second largest income percent 
by household in Sitka, second to “services.”122 In order to support the large fleet, the City 
of Sitka has five expansive harbors; ANB, Crescent, Eliason, Sealing, and Thomsen 
Harbor. According to the Sitka Economic Development Association (SEDA), these five 
harbors contain 1,315 boat slips.123 Sitka is also home to two large fish processing plants, 
Sitka Sound Seafoods and Silver Bay Seafoods. Commercial, recreational, and charter 
fisheries provide jobs to a large portion of Sitka’s community. According to SEDA Sitka 
is ranked #14 in the U.S. by weight and #11 by value:124 
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Harvesting 
 Resident commercial fishing permit holders (active) = 566 
 Total permits issued = 1,055 
 Permit holders who fished = 446 
 Permits fished = 718 
 Commercial fishing vessels homeported in Sitka = 669 
 Total Pounds Landed = 36,501,268 
 Estimated Gross Earnings = $38,346,917 
 
 
Processing – Shore Side 
 Wholesale value of seafood processed in Sitka = $48,019,694 
 Net weight pounds processed in Sitka = 85,591,436 lbs. 
 Raw fish tax (support city harbors) = $1,009,033 
 Seafood processing jobs = 1,102 
Beyond commercial fishing, Sitkans also look to the ocean for subsistence 
purposes. Many Alaskans are reliant on their ability to harvest their own food. From 
deer hunting to fishing to berry picking Alaskans are resourceful in finding wild 
products with which to fill their freezers. In addition to black-tail deer and mountain 
goat, Sitkans work hard to harvest fresh fish to feed their families. In 2013, Sitkan’s 
subsistence harvested 904,498.8lbs of fish, which demonstrates the vitality of fisheries to 
families in Sitka.125 
 Sitka is critically positioned for this study due to its large fishing fleet, ability to 
support alternate livelihoods, participation in fisheries management, and unique fishery 
management safeguards. Sitka is economically and culturally linked to commercial 
fisheries; fishing has not only become a profitable livelihood, but a way of life.  
                                                 
125 Koster. Sitka, Harvest [Internet]. (AK); Alaska Department of Fish and Game; 2013 [cited 2018 Feb 
18]. Available from 
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SAFEGUARDS & AREA 2C 
 
Area 2C in Southeast Alaska is of special interest when studying Pacific halibut IFQs 
because many of the unique safeguards laid out at the onset of the program have 
remained intact. These seven main restrictions were put into place as safeguards to 
combat consolidation, trading, and non-fishermen quota ownership.126 Many now 
attribute these to the success of Pacific Halibut IFQs as other programs without these 
have failed miserably at retaining social fairness, eluding consolidation, and keeping 
purely capital-driven investors out of the industry. The safeguard restrictions pertinent to 
area 2C for Pacific halibut IFQs are as follows127,128: 
1. Vessels must abide by size classes associated with quota permits (A, B, C, D). 
2. Owner on board clause: quota shareholders must be on board during fishing 
operations. 
3. Block plan: smaller quota shares less than 20,000 lbs. cannot be consolidated with 
other permits. 
4. Only quota share recipients or crewmembers with 150 days of experience in a 
U.S. fishery may buy quota. 
5. Ownership caps: total landings of any vessel may not exceed 1% of the TAC in 
area 2C and total landings of a single quota holder may not exceed 0.5% of the 
TAC in area 2C.  
6. Buydown Amendment: quota can only be sold down vessel class and not up. The 
delineation between vessel classes has become merged in other areas. 
7. Leasing/purchasing provisions: catcher boats are barred from leasing quota. 
Buyers of quota must be U.S. citizens, crewmembers, or those that partake in 
vessel operations. 
 
                                                 
126 Knapp, G. 1996. Alaska Halibut Captains’ Attitudes Towards IFQs. Marine Resource Economics. 11(1): 
43–55. 
127 I.d. 
128 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council, 1-17. https://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/ 
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Safeguards 5 and 6 are unique to area 2C because the ownership caps are based only on 
the TAC of the single management area and in other areas some of the delineations used 
in the buy-down amendment have been vertically integrated.  
According to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), “The 
primary intent of the Council in adopting these provisions was to maintain a diverse, 
owner-operated fleet and prevent a ‘corporate’, absentee ownership of the fisheries.”129 
Both the owner on board clause and days of experience clause were put in place to 
restrict the entrance of non-fishermen into the industry. The block plan was put in place 
to make entrance into the fishery affordable.130 Generally, when IFQs are put in place it is 
common for permit prices to be momentous and block new entrance into the fishery, 
which can lead to a greying/aging fleet. The block provision was intended to prevent this 
and allow new entrants via these small blocks of quota. Finally, the total landings and 
buydown amendment (1996) were put in place to prevent consolidation at all levels, but 
specifically in classes where vessels may be more efficient.131 In other words, these 
safeguards help maintain a healthy small-boat fleet and keep wealth evenly distributed 
throughout the fishery. 
                                                 
129 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council, 1-17, at pg. 11. https://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/ 
130 I.d. 
131 I.d. 
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KNOWN IMPACTS OF HALIBUT IFQS 
 
There were many negative and positive implications that resulted from the 
enactment of IFQs in the Pacific Halibut fishery. Knapp (1997) found that fishermen 
frequently stated that the quota allocation was too small, there were many administrative 
burdens, and the initial allocation was unfair.132 Holland, et al. (2017) found that IFQs 
reduced fleet diversification, which leads to increased financial risk and a reduction in 
income stability.133 They also concluded that the ability to diversify in Alaska has 
become extremely controlled because of the inability of people to enter the fishery due to 
high quota prices.134 Brinson and Thunberg (2016) found that due to IFQs, Alaska has 
seen the largest reduction in active fishing vessels over the history of all U.S. 
programs.135 In 1995, before IFQs were implemented, there were 3,432 active Pacific 
Halibut vessels, but in 2013 only 937 vessels remained.136 Additionally, Carothers (2013) 
found that 84% of fishermen surveyed believe that IFQs are changing fishing lifestyle 
resulting in a privileged class of fishermen and 75% stated that they are changing 
community values.137 Finally, Sinclair (1983) concluded that social consequences of 
                                                 
132 Knapp, G. 1997. Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments of Alaska 
Fishermen. Marine Resource Economics. 12(3): 239–248. 
133 Holland, D. S., Speir, C., Agar, J., Crosson, S., DePiper, G., Kasperski, S., Perruso, L. 2017. Impact of 
catch shares on diversification of fishers’ income and risk. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences. 114(35): 9302–9307. 
134 I.d. 
135 Brinson, A. A., Thunberg, E. M. 2016. Performance of federally managed catch share fisheries in the 
United States. Fisheries Research. 179: 213-223. 
136 I.d. 
137 Carothers, C. 2013. A survey of US halibut IFQ holders: Market participation, attitudes, and impacts. 
Marine Policy. 38: 515-522. 
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limited entry systems outweigh economic benefits because limited entry is a flawed 
system that is detrimental for isolated fishery dependent regions.138  
 Despite these negative outcomes, there were many benefits that resulted from the 
implementation of IFQs in the Pacific Halibut fishery. Prior to 1995, thousands of halibut 
boats caught the total TAC in a few 24-hour periods. This type of derby fishing 
dramatically reduced safety, increased gear abandonment, decreased fresh fish supply 
throughout the year, decreased market price, and increased the cost of rescue efforts. 
Knapp (1996) found that some captains preferred IFQs because it allowed them to choose 
when to go out in order to avoid bad/unsafe weather conditions, increased safety on 
board, created better market prices, reduced crowding of fishing grounds, and fostered a 
less stressful work environment.139 Knapp (1999) found that 85% of those sampled 
believed IFQs made fishing safer.140 Many of the statements recorded included references 
to weather, shorter trips, the elimination of derby fishing, and the ability to work at a 
more comfortable pace.141 Finally, Brinson and Thunberg (2016) found that the season 
length increased from 0.1 years to 0.7 years and the average price increased from 
$1.91/lb to $4.86/lb.142 
                                                 
138 Sinclair, P. 1983. Fishermen divided: The impact of limited entry licensing in northwest Newfoundland. 
Human Organization. 42(4): 307-313. 
139 Knapp, G. 1997. Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments of Alaska 
Fishermen. Marine Resource Economics. 12(3): 239–248. 
140 Knapp, G. 1999. Effect of IFQ management on fishing safety: Survey responses of Alaska Halibut 
fishermen. ISER working paper series, 1-11. 
141 I.d. 
142 Brinson, A. A., Thunberg, E. M. 2016. Performance of federally managed catch share fisheries in the 
United States. Fisheries Research. 179: 213-223. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Data were collected over a three-month period from June to August 2018 in Sitka 
Alaska. Data collection consisted of a qualitative, multi-step, mixed method approach. 
General observations occurred first, followed by semi-structured interviews, and surveys. 
Interviews were transcribed and combined with the typed data from the surveys. 
Statements were sorted for each question to capture to views of each participant. Due to 
the qualitative nature of this project, the captured opinions show perceived IFQ 
satisfaction and perceived safeguard effectiveness of the subjects sampled for this study. 
Finally, to ensure consistency of sorting, only one researcher was responsible for 
transcribing and sorting responses. As researchers, we tried to eliminate bias, but with a 
project such as this, there is inherent objectivity in sorting responses and categorizing 
subject’s opinions.    
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GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
The first few weeks in Sitka were spent acclimating to community life and 
behaviors, as well as building instrumental relationships. During this time general 
observations concerning fishing operations and local traditions were observed and 
recorded. These loose observations were recorded as field notes that included annotations 
on estimated crew size, dominant fishing gear types, number of boats at the docks, etc. 
During these first few weeks, invaluable relationships and connections were made with 
locals that became crucial in the process of soliciting interviews. Sitka’s fishing 
community is close-knit, so it took considerable time and effort to build relationships and 
trust that would allow for the formation of paths of communication. Without living, 
working, and being involved with the community for a significant amount of time, these 
interviews would not have been possible. It is well known throughout the social science 
community that more reliable interview results are yielded from a researcher who lives 
within the community as a polite observer rather than one approaching the question from 
the outside.143 Throughout the summer the researcher lived, worked, went commercial 
halibut fishing, processed fish on local boats, helped local fishermen offload fish, 
attended local tribal meetings, worked with a local fisheries conservation organization, 
and hosted community outreach events in Sitka. This active involvement caused the 
researcher to become a well-known face in the community, which allowed for interviews 
that otherwise would not have taken place. 
                                                 
143 Moore, A. 2018. Personal Communication. The University of Rhode Island. 
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SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with two main groups of subjects, 
current Pacific halibut fishermen and former Pacific halibut fishermen. Current fishermen 
included four main groups of subjects; quota holders who were initial recipients, quota 
holders who have since bought in after initial implementation of IFQs, crewmembers, and 
hired skippers. Former fishermen consisted of four main groups of subjects; those who 
were excluded from initial allocation and never bought in, those who have sold all their 
IFQ, previous crewmembers, and medical transferees (those who hire skippers to fish 
their quota due to a non-chronic medical condition). Snowball sampling was utilized to 
locate subjects. All interviews were conducted face-to-face, recorded, and transcribed at 
another time. All interviews were conducted in Sitka, AK and most commonly occurred 
at fishing harbors, on subject’s boats, at subject’s houses, or in Alaska Longline 
Fishermen’s Association’s local office. The choice of where to meet was most often left 
to the interviewee to ensure they were comfortable in the interview setting. Interviews 
lasted anywhere from 30-120 minutes, depending on the interviewee’s availability and 
depth of answers. A list of sample questions is provided in appendix one of this paper, 
but only served as a guide to facilitate the sharing of opinions and stories. The key and 
most important questions are bold-faced. After the interview data were transcribed, 
statements from each question were grouped into major, reoccurring themes and 
compared to previous findings by other researchers. 
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SEMI-STRUCTURED SURVEYS 
 
This research transpired during the busy fishing season, which meant that many 
individuals who wanted to participate in the face-to-face interview process were unable to 
because they were out at sea. In order to facilitate their participation, open-ended email 
surveys that utilized Google Forms were used in lieu of face-to-face interviews. The 
questions asked during the interviews and surveys were the same to retain consistency. In 
addition to the structured, open-ended questions, there was a section of the survey in 
which participants could add any thoughts they had or share any stories they found to be 
pertinent. In order to compile fishermen’s emails for the survey Alaska Longline 
Fishermen’s Association’s subscription program was utilized, in addition to contact 
information given by local experts and research subjects during snowball sampling. The 
quoted responses from these surveys were integrated for analysis and sorting with the 
transcribed interview data. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
 
PACIFIC HALIBUT IFQ SATISFACTION 
 
In total, 31 individuals participated in this study (n=31). Of those 31 individuals, 
22 participated in face-to-face, semi-structured interviews and 9 submitted their 
responses on the Google Form survey. The face-to-face interviews lasted anywhere from 
approximately 15 minutes to 120 minutes and on average took about 35 minutes. In total, 
754 minutes were used to create the transcriptions utilized in analyzing the results of this 
study.  
Figure 1: Research subject demographics based on the Pacific halibut IFQ system. Those excluded 
included, crewmembers, those who started fishing after IFQs, and other/unknown. 
All subjects were either previous or current Pacific halibut fishermen and 2 of the 
31 were Alaskan Natives. Of the 31 individuals, 14 were initial recipients of IFQs and 17 
received no quota from the initial allocation (figure 1). Initial allocation to a single 
Initial 
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14
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13
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Initial 
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individual ranged from 5,000lbs to 120,000lbs. Of the 17 who were left out of the initial 
allocation of IFQs, 13 were crewmembers, 2 started fishing after the IFQ program was 
implemented, and 2 are unknown as they did not specify on the Google survey (figure 1).  
 From the various questions posed to research subjects to gauge acceptance of 
IFQs, it was determined that overall the subjects sampled generally approved of the 
Pacific halibut IFQ program. There were 22 subjects that expressed approval for the IFQ 
program, 8 that disapproved, and 1 that was indifferent (table 1). Within the group of 
 
initial recipients, 12 approved and 2 disapproved of Pacific halibut IFQs (table 1). Within 
the group of those excluded from initial IFQ allocation, 10 approved, 6 disapproved, and 
1 was indifferent concerning Pacific halibut IFQ management (table 1).  
Further examination must be given to the group excluded from the initial 
allocation that disapproved of IFQs in order to understand the subjects’ rational. As 
shown in table 2 the large majority of those excluded from initial IFQ allocation that 
disapproved of Pacific halibut IFQs are/were crewmembers (table 2). 
 Overall Initial Recipients 
Not Initial 
Recipients 
Approved 22 12 10 
Disapproved  8 2 6 
Indifferent 1 0 1 
Table 1: IFQ satisfaction based on allocation status. 
 Not Initial Recipients That Disapprove of IFQs 
Crewmembers 5 
Started Fishing After IFQs 1 
Table 2: The largest majority of those who were excluded from the initial allocation and 
disapprove of IFQs were/are crewmembers. 
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All subjects were also asked their opinions regarding what impact  
 Pacific halibut IFQ management had on them as individuals and on their communities 
(tables 3 and 4). In general, the majority of subjects who were initial recipients of Pacific 
halibut IFQs believed that the program had both a positive impact on their individual 
lives their community (table 3).  
Initial Recipients Individual Community 
Both (N, P) 0 2 
Negative 2 5 
Positive 12 7 
Table 3: Initial IFQ recipients’ opinions concerning the impacts of IFQs on both a community 
level and an individual level (N=negative, P=positive). 
 
However, those subjects who were not awarded quota during the initial allocation 
believed that Pacific halibut IFQ management had a negative impact on their community, 
but a positive impact on their individual lives (table 4). 
Not Initial Recipients Individual Community 
Both (N, P) 0 3 
Negative 6 10 
Positive 8 2 
Indifferent 2 2 
Unclear 1 0 
Table 4: Opinions of those excluded from the initial IFQ allocation concerning the impacts of 
IFQs on both a community level and an individual level (N=negative, P=positive). 
 
 Those individuals who generally approved of the Pacific halibut IFQ management 
scheme expressed similar beliefs as those found by Knapp (1996), Knapp (1999), and 
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Brinson and Thunberg (2016).144 ,145 ,146 Many subjects referenced the improvements in 
safety, better quality halibut, longer seasons, the ability to pick their weather, better price 
for halibut, and added market stability as positive impacts of the Pacific halibut IFQ 
system. In almost every interview, subjects compared their experiences during the derby 
days with that of their current fishing experiences: 
“[Compared to the derby days there’s] a longer season, a lot higher price, a 
lot safer, less gear costs, less bycatch, yeah I can’t really think of anything 
better about the derby system.” 
 
“Although we listened to the weather forecast it didn't matter, you went 
anyway. And it was stressful, and you pushed things hard and you did things 
you shouldn't have done, and it didn't matter what the weather was. It was not 
very safe, and you didn't handle the fish nearly as well as you do now 
because you didn't have time to. And you took what you could get for price 
because since it was only open a couple days a year then the processors could 
do what they wanted with the price. Today in the IFQ fishery, well as soon as 
IFQs started, we started letting our kids come halibut fishing. We wouldn't let 
them before because they were too young, and it was too dangerous. 
Although they went on other fisheries. And today you get to pick when you 
fish within the 9-month time period, but you can really pick it day by day 
with weather. If you don’t like the looks of the weather you don’t have to go, 
you don’t have to endanger yourself and your crew. And to me that’s huge. 
And the other thing that’s huge is that the public gets fresh halibut 9 months 
out of the year instead of 3 or 4 days out of the year. And the fish is much 
better cared for and I think it’s a much better use of the resource.” 
 
During the Pacific halibut derby fishery, time was so restricted that fishermen 
would spend all the time they could just getting the fish in the boat. This meant fish were 
not properly dressed for hours or days. Additionally, ice and slush were often forgone to 
create more room in the holds for halibut. As a result, not only were fish not gutted, they 
                                                 
144 Knapp, G. 1997. Initial Effects of the Alaska Halibut IFQ Program: Survey Comments of Alaska 
Fishermen. Marine Resource Economics. 12(3): 239–248. 
145 Knapp, G. 1999. Effect of IFQ management on fishing safety: Survey responses of Alaska Halibut 
fishermen. ISER working paper series, 1-11. 
146 Brinson, A. A., Thunberg, E. M. 2016. Performance of federally managed catch share fisheries in the 
United States. Fisheries Research. 179: 213-223. 
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were not iced until the derby was over and the crew had time to prepare for delivery. 
Many subjects gave powerful accounts of how the handling of the halibut resource has 
changed since the implementation of IFQs: 
“You didn’t have a choice of when you fished before, good or bad weather 
you had to do it. It also was, it was like a rush. You went out, you caught as 
many fish as you could, and you come back and then you waited in line and 
typically you were still cleaning because you didn't have time to actually 
process the fish at the time you were fishing them. Right, so I mean just the 
whole quality of the whole thing was just a nightmare. I mean I remember the 
[boat] in Port Alexander, it would be sinking from the weight of the fish, 
there’d be like 4 inches of water on the deck because it had sunk down two 
feet just about to the point where it was just underwater because it had so 
many fish. And they couldn't process them, they couldn't manage them. I 
mean the whole thing was a freaking nightmare. And on top of that, you 
know I mean, when I finally did start fishing IFQ after losing the job I, you 
know the price just started going up and up and up, and the quality just got 
better and better and better. I mean, to me, it’s just night and day, the 
difference...I cannot understand how anyone would prefer the derby, even 
people that lost their jobs. I lost my job and I was happy about it.” 
 
“The last derby fishery that I remember, I actually left Alaska for a little 
while because I was really only going up seasonally at that point and an old 
friend of mine called me up for that last 48-hour halibut opener, which I think 
would have been in the fall of 94 or 95...So I did and that was our last 48-
hour opener and the weather was really, really bad. And we all got weathered 
in in Pelican and had a lot of fun. But that's the only time I actually felt like 
wow I’m not going to make it physically through this opener, I think I’m 
going to have to say I can’t do it. And about that time our skipper called it, 
he’s like the weather’s just too bad, we’ve gotta go in. So, I was like whew! 
But of course, I’m thinking like oh my god we’re leaving those fish in the 
water, which of course people did back in those days because you know 
you’d set a bunch of gear, as much as you possibly could think that you could 
possibly haul in 24 hours or 48 hours...If the weather came up you were in a 
tough situation, you had to decide whether to keep fishing. You had to decide 
whether to leave your gear in the water, knowing you won’t be able to 
harvest those fish after it closes. So basically, you’re shaking live fish or dead 
fish, or you know re-bites, which is dead fish that have now been eaten by a 
live fish which has now died.” 
 
“It opened, the weather was pretty nice, people set their gear, and then the 
weather blew up. So, you got all this gear in the water and for a lot of people, 
smaller boats, the weather was so tough they couldn't pick it up. So, the gear 
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just sat there in the water. The fishery was over, it was like a one-day fishery, 
so all of a sudden, the fish are you know you couldn’t haul the gear. The 
Coast Guard would be out there in the helicopter and you couldn’t haul the 
gear after it closed, so people just let it sit there And I came out 
[trolling]…and I bet I counted 20 longline strings in a couple of miles that 
were just sitting there. This was just like 3-4 days after it closed. Guys would 
come and pick up the gear because it’s valuable, but all the fish were 
dead…So that’s when I became a real advocate for IFQs.” 
 
When thousands of boats are catching the majority of the halibut for the global market in 
a matter of days or hours, how do managers and enforcement agencies properly gauge 
how much bycatch there is or how much halibut is unnecessarily wasted? This answer is, 
realistically they cannot. These accounts vividly paint the wasteful picture that the halibut 
fishery was before IFQ management. 
Managing the halibut fishery as a derby had significant impacts on safety. 
Fishermen depended on just hours or days to make a significant portion of their yearly 
income. As a result, safety was often sacrificed in order to keep fishing. One of the most 
commonly mentioned reasons for supporting the Pacific halibut IFQ program is the 
improvement of safety, which was caused by being able to pick your weather, work at a 
more relaxed pace, and the reduction of fishing pressure: 
“When you talk to the old guys that did the derby for longer than I did I mean 
they’re still nursing injuries from the derby. Things like, oh I gaffed my foot 
and we just fished anyways and now I have a limp, or oh I smashed my finger 
and instead of going to the hospital we fished anyways and now I don’t have 
a finger…The injuries people work through, just because there was no other 
choice and if they had a choice they would probably would have been fine. 
They would have just gone in and gotten it taken care of and everything 
would have been fine, but no instead they just continued to work.” 
 
“Yeah [IFQs] have changed my life. It’s made that fishery so much safer. 
And you didn’t go out with this feeling in the pit of your stomach of whose 
turn is it to get in trouble. And you know there was regular sinking’s during 
the derbies.” 
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“It’s changed it where it’s just so much safer and the quality of the product is 
so much better. And I like that, I like being able to say no I don’t want to go 
today, I don’t like that forecast.” 
 
“The derby fishery was the reason the IFQ program got traction. Every 
halibut opening, we would have here, people were going to die. Fish were 
wasted, incredibly wasted. You know you have a two-day opening, people 
knew that maybe a set or two wasn’t gonna work out very well. They’d 
intentionally set more gear than they knew they could haul, so in case one 
was bad they could drop it and go to another, leaving a whole lot of dead fish 
in the water. It was really wasteful. And just the intensity of it all…you know 
we’d probably spend ten days getting ready for a two-day fishery. So, you 
know, you put all this time and effort into it and of course the night before it 
opens you get a big storm that blows through and you know as the skipper 
you can’t tell these guys ‘hey we aren't gonna go.’ You know because they 
got ten days, they took time off from their jobs or whatever, so you would go. 
And it was really risky in some cases and that’s when people died. And you 
know the exhaustion of it all. We’d have these 48-hour openings and they’d 
start at like noon, but you know you were nervous, you didn't sleep very well 
the night before. So you go out there and even if the weather was decent 
you’d start at about noon, so you fished through the first night until noon the 
next and you know you’re doing pretty good, but the second night...you were 
really tired...I was the one on the roller and I know a couple of times I fell 
asleep standing up at the roller and starting to hallucinate. It was just a great 
situation to get mangled. I can’t say enough bad about [the derbies], it was a 
terrible way to manage a fishery.” 
 
Subjects in favor of IFQs also stated the positive impacts the management 
program had on the price and market for Pacific halibut fish. Due to the fact that the 
season was extended, fresh halibut was provided to the market all year, the fish were 
handled and processed better, and fishermen could choose to go fish when the price per 
pound was higher. This resulted in an overall higher dock price for halibut: 
“What happened was that the market eventually corrected for these 
avalanches of poor-quality fish that were coming during the derby days and 
the fresh market started to grow, people started to eat more halibut...By the 
early 2000s, the price was starting to go up. So that definitely had an effect 
on our own fishing economy. It improved greatly because of that fact.” 
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Additionally, IFQs are transferrable and as a result, hold significant monetary value. This 
provides fishermen with some financial flexibility: 
“… [IFQs have] enabled me to stay in the commercial fishery, I guess. They 
also have allowed me to grow my business in predictable ways. Borrowed 
against them to buy more quota and stuff like that. So, it’s been good.” 
 
“Before IFQs there was no way for like fishermen to really build something 
to retire on and this kind of allowed people to build up a little something to 
retire on when they get old. Like any business, you build it up and then you 
can pass it on to your kids or sell it and have a little bit of retirement.” 
 
“…pre IFQ there wasn't an option for holding a portion of the quota, and in 
response to implementation of that program we’ve made investments and planned 
our, you know, retirement so to speak or our whole investment strategy on the 
rules of the IFQ program.” 
 
This study demonstrated that overall, the research subjects expressed more 
general support for the Pacific halibut IFQ program than opposition to IFQs. However, 
even two decades later there is still a large portion of fishermen who disapproved of the 
Pacific halibut management program. In a nutshell, the IFQ program simply decreased 
fishing effort by removing a large portion of individuals from the fishery. In other words, 
the fleet becomes significantly consolidated. As stated by Grimm, et al., (2012), in 1935 
there were less than 5,000 U.S. fishing vessels and by 1975 this increased to 
approximately 17,000 fishing vessels, however, landings remained around 2.9-3.8 billion 
pounds despite the dramatic increase in the number of vessels fishing.147 IFQs don't 
change the overall TAC or necessarily improve the health of the fishing stock, but rather 
take the resources from the many and redistribute them to the few. In turn, the people 
who are gifted access to the fishery feel as though the resource is better providing for 
                                                 
147 Grimm, D., Barkhorn, I., Festa, D., Bonzon, K., Boomhower, J., Hovland, V., Blau, J. 2012. Assessing 
catch shares’ effects evidence from Federal United States and associated British Columbian fisheries. 
Marine Policy. 36(3): 644-657. 
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them because they have less competition and access to a larger portion of the stock. 
Simply put, IFQs are effective at generating wealth for those with fishing history. This 
sentiment was expressed by many subjects: 
“You really haven't done anything for the [fisheries] by bringing IFQs into it, 
besides make a bunch of millionaires.” 
 
“But we fought really hard against it because we felt like what the IFQ 
system does is it creates wealth. It privatizes the fish. The state of Alaska 
limited entry system does a really good job of spreading that wealth out 
throughout the fleet It was created with the idea in mind of giving the 
maximum number of people a reasonable way to make a living. And, you 
know, commercial fishing program in Alaska has done that really well. IFQs 
on the other hand, the tendency to consolidation, and to do it on fewer and 
fewer boats with stacking of permits, and fishing other people’s quota, it was 
an obvious problem. So, you know, we fought really hard against it." 
 
 The fleet consolidation that results from IFQs creates a domino effect that reduces 
the number of jobs in the community and the amount of capital flow through the 
community. The question then becomes do we want to increase the value of the resource 
or provide jobs to more people in the community? The fishing economy doesn't just 
provide jobs to fishermen, but also to processors, gear supply stores, grocery stores, 
schools, etc.: 
“There was a lot more movement of money through a lot more of these towns 
prior to IFQs. Which is not to say the IFQs caused the stagnation, but you 
know some of the underlying problems are still not being addressed...Now 
you have all of these IFQ holders holding onto their stock and making a 
bunch of money and you know hoarding it in one place or just keeping it to 
themselves as opposed to during the derby years you had a lot of flow of 
money going to the town and now...it’s not like that anymore...less 
predictability, and less movement of financial transactions.” 
 
“I feel like it stratified the economy and that’s never a good thing...I think 
that a lot of the people who own the majority of the IFQs don’t live in 
Alaska...and the state of Alaska doesn't have an income tax, so it doesn't 
benefit locally.” 
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 Another consequence of fleet consolidation and the reduction in competition 
is the expansion of temporal and spatial impact. Due to the decrease in fishing 
pressure the length of the Pacific halibut season has greatly increased, which allows 
individuals more harvest time. Could this extension of the season increase levels of 
bycatch? Additionally, before IFQs the halibut stock was only fished a few times a 
year; does switching to a nine-month season and expanding temporal impacts have 
any unintended consequences on the stock? One fisherman commented on this: 
“It [the IFQ program] must have had some effect. We’ve gone from fishing 
the ocean for a week a year to fishing it for months a year. What’s that 
effect?…So I think that probably having, you know, 11.5 months where they 
were unmolested had a different effect on the school than fishing it for a 
longer period of time.” 
 
 Also due to the decreased competition, boats are sparse while fishing so fishermen 
don’t tend to travel to distant fishing grounds as frequently as they did during the 
derby days. What ecosystem impacts could this be having? One subject explained 
this phenomenon: 
“[People] can fish in inside waters, so that’s another change that happened. 
When you had the derbies, everybody had to spread out, but now people are 
hammering areas. You know why burn the fuel to go 200 miles away when 
you can now take your time, and everyone fishes the same 30-mile area.” 
 
This is also supported by a 2007 study concerning artisanal fishing behavior.148 
Abernethy, et al. (2007) found that fishermen’s behavior is likely driven by family 
tradition, tradeoffs with leisure time, and cost of fuel and gear.149 Traveling to distant 
                                                 
148 Abernethy, E., Allison, E.H., Molloy, P.P., Cote, I.M. 2007. Why do fishers fish where they fish? Using 
the ideal free distribution to understand the behaviour of artisanal reef fishers. Canadian Journal of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences. 64: 1595-1604. 
149 I.d. 
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fishing grounds requires extra time and fuel, without a guaranteed return on those 
investments. 
It has been made clear by the data stated previously that disapproval for 
Pacific halibut IFQs is much higher among subjects who were not gifted quota. The 
largest majority of those not gifted quota were or are crewmembers. Many consider 
crewmembers to be the ones who fared the worst during IFQ allocation. Due to the 
fact that vessel owners and leaseholders ‘risked the most’ effort and capital they 
were awarded the quota.150 However many subjects felt that this was unfair and 
misguided: 
“So, all over Southeast Alaska and all over Alaska there were people that 
were completely cut out when they did [IFQs]. And ignored the maritime 
law, which the way crewman worked for millennia, you know it came from 
Britain, you were not paid wages, you got a share, you were a partner, you 
worked your way up through the program where your shares increased. Like 
you started out at a quarter share, then you went to half share, three quarters 
share, full share. It was a big deal to be a full share guy, but when they did 
the IFQs they said they have no investment, no skin in the game, which 
wasn't true. Crewman paid for the lost gear, they paid for the insurance, they 
paid for the fuel, and they paid for the groceries. They paid for everything 
except the boat.” 
 
This research is critical to the existing body of literature because it captures the 
opinions of many crewmembers and those who were not awarded any quota. According 
to Carothers (2015), crewmembers and next-generation fishermen are disproportionally 
impacted by resource privatization.151 In other words, there are those who receive the 
windfall and those who do not. The literature is greatly lacking in capturing the views of 
                                                 
150 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council, 1-17. https://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/ 
151 Carothers, C. 2015. Fisheries Privatization, social transitions, and well-being in Kodiak Alaska. Marine 
Policy. 61: 313-322. 
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these individuals because “Those who likely fared the worst exited fishing and are thus 
challenging to locate.”152 This is evident and supported in the current scientific literature, 
which largely focuses on the opinions of quota holders and captains (Berman & Leasak, 
1994, Carothers, 2015, Carothers, 2013, Carothers & Lew, 2010, Knapp, 1996, Knapp 
1997, Knapp & Hull 1996, Kotlarov, 2015).153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 This research seeks 
to shed light not only on the opinions of the ‘haves’ but also the ‘have nots’: 
“Of course, it was very controversial with letter writing and anti-IFQ and pro-
IFQ and others. And we were all looking at other ways to manage the system, 
but I think it was very controversial and divisive in the fishing community 
because you could see the factions and they call it privatization of a 
resource…For me, it was a big, those who have and those who have not, so 
that's very transparent.” 
 
According to one crewman interviewed, “The crewmen called them ‘I 
F[expletive] Yous’ And they were, they were you know”. It was an extremely divisive 
time to be in Sitka, AK. Relationships were destroyed or strained based on individual’s 
opinions concerning the potential Pacific halibut IFQ program. As one might guess, those 
who knew they would benefit were on one side of the battle while those who might lose 
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their livelihoods were on the other side. Neighbor against neighbor. According to one 
subject, “…if you were not one of the ones that were ‘in’ you were nothing. Nobody 
wanted to talk to you, they don't care, yeah it was really ugly.” As expressed by this 
subject, privatization often shifts the power relationships between quota holders, 
skippers, crew, and neighbors in the community.161 When the Pacific halibut IFQ 
management scheme was enacted a significant number of crewmembers lost their jobs 
due to the immediate consolidation of the fleet (subjects’ use of the term ‘deckhand’ is 
equivalent to ‘crewmember’): 
“[The] overall the effect I think of the IFQ system was a major loss of 
deckhand jobs...It’s a little bit of a sharecropper situation now, where my 
friends can’t afford to go out and catch their own fish. I mean they could, but 
why would they when they can go walk on another boat and have their friend 
[catch it]. [The quota holders] do a lot of the crew work, so the [captain] has 
one crew member and takes 2 [walk-ons] ...So there’s just less jobs and the 
crew shares went down…So that was one of the big changes, was the cut in 
deckhand jobs and the lowering percentage that goes to the deckhands.” 
 
“And certainly, deckhands felt like cattle, you know, you were like a cog. 
You no longer had any relevance, you could be replaced because, you know, 
there were lots of people looking for deckhand jobs.” 
 
"What it did was immediately pitted people, the ones who knew they were 
going to be extremely wealthy because of this and the rest of the you know 
all of the deckhands. Basically, if you were a deckhand and you didn't buy 
quota you were out of luck...Yeah, it was a horrible time in this town and 
certainly in the fishing fleet in this town...If you were not one of the ones 
who set it up to benefit you, who chose the years, the qualifying years? I 
know people who fished halibut and black cod for years before that, but you 
know maybe they hadn't been around those years or had been injured, or 
whatever, for some reason they didn’t fish, or they fished minimally during 
the years that counted and they got almost no quota. And some of those were 
really the people that pioneered the fishery.”  
 
                                                 
161 Carothers, C. 2015. Fisheries Privatization, social transitions, and well-being in Kodiak Alaska. Marine 
Policy. 61: 313-322. 
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All of the ‘have nots’ of halibut IFQs were not just crewmembers. Some 
individuals expressed they had been fishing their whole lives but had been injured or 
otherwise obligated during the narrow qualifying years. This barred them from eligibility 
for quota, and as a result, some have never fished for halibut again. A few subjects 
explained that this was what had happened to them: 
 “I had $30,000 in just longline gear for example. And I had done about 
$30,000 worth of work to my boat to make it efficient...And you know I 
competed, I could catch. But I started crewing and I couldn't get back to Sitka 
to do a 24-hour halibut opening and because I didn't make a delivery in those 
three years, I didn't know about that language either, it wasn't available to the 
public. I didn't get one pound and I had fished halibut for 20 years before 
the deadline and there’s a lot of people like that.” 
 
Finally, Pacific halibut IFQs had adverse effects on communities throughout 
Alaska. According to Carothers (2015), privatization is a “fundamental driver of 
social change in fishing communities.”162 The ripple effect felt throughout 
communities is explained by several subjects below: 
“There’s a lot less boats participating in the, particularly the halibut fishery, 
by half than there was in the derby years. So, I see that affecting the support 
sector mostly. I mean the people who are in have more, but having more 
boats supported a much more active, shipwrights, and fiberglass, and 
machinists, and you know all of that that goes along with that...So when you 
lose that support sector the fleet and the community becomes less viable. So, 
Sitka has been able to maintain that, but it's not easy. But the smaller 
communities have not been able to maintain that small sector and if you lose 
that and you lose your processor then that fish goes out of town and you lose 
all of that raw fish tax and sort of that economic activity generated by 
landings. So big impacts on communities for sure, but much more so the rural 
or remote rural communities than the ‘urban’ bigger Alaskan communities 
like Sitka, Petersburg, and Ketchikan.” 
 
“The entity that [IFQs] hurt the most was the villages. The only cash 
economy in Alaska on the coast in the villages is fishing. And all the villages 
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here in Southeast, all of them, would fish halibut. They’d fish in little skiffs; 
the historic makeup was in thirds. A third were skiffs., a third were medium-
sized boats...and a third were large boats. And those three different sizes of 
boats each caught a third of the [TAC]. The skiffs, there were a lot more of 
them, caught a third of the [TAC]. The middle-sized boats, there were a less 
than the skiffs, caught a third of the [TAC], and the large boats caught a third 
of the [TAC]. And when they went to the derbies, as they got compacted, the 
skiffs got cut out because the people over in Angoon couldn't go out in a 40-
knot blow when there was an opening.” 
 
The second subject makes an interesting point, that they believe the weeding out 
of small-boat fishermen began before IFQs. That it actually began with the poor 
management of the derby style fishery. Due to the fact that small boats couldn't risk 
going out in bad weather for a derby, many lost their fishing history, which made them 
ineligible for IFQ allocation. 
Overall, 20 out of 31 subjects believe that Pacific halibut IFQs have had some sort 
of negative impact on their communities. This is significant because only 8 out of 31 
subjects believe that Pacific halibut IFQs have had a negative impact on their individual 
lives. This is similar to what Carothers (2015) found when studying fisheries 
privatization in Kodiak, Alaska.163 In that 2015 study, the researchers found that 
respondents were more unified in identifying negative impacts to the community versus 
individual well-being.164 I think the data presented supports the assertion that this is due 
to the fact that the monetary gains were greater for individuals compared to communities. 
In the case of Pacific halibut IFQs community economies seem to be taking the hit. An 
alternative explanation for this is the time that has passed since the implementation of the 
Pacific halibut IFQ program. As explained by one subject: 
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Policy. 61: 313-322. 
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“[IFQs] tore the community apart during the years of fighting over IFQs, the 
gap years, and then when the quota program went into place. And it took a lot 
of years for that to settle down. There’re some people who really fought it, 
but once it went down bought in and really made it work for them. And 
there’s some people who were still bitter and unhappy about it, but there are 
more and more people I guess who IFQs have been the reality ever since they 
entered the fishery. So, there’s over time I would say it’s, that rift is healing.” 
 
These data do include the views of several subjects who did not begin fishing until 
after the implementation of the IFQ program. This may have skewed the opinion of 
IFQs in the positive direction. 
 In conclusion, it can be affirmed that, in general, among the subjects of this 
research support for Pacific halibut IFQs outweighs the opposition. Regardless, there 
are still flaws of the program that must be analyzed in order to understand the full 
and lasting impacts the Pacific halibut IFQ program has had on fishing communities.  
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SAFEGUARD EFFECTIVENESS 
 
The Pacific halibut IFQ program is unique from other IFQ programs because of 
the numerous measures put in place to safeguard the industry from known impacts of 
privatization. Numerous fishermen in this study attributed the success of the Pacific 
halibut IFQ program to these safeguards; “Without these caveats, the IFQ plan would 
have been a big mistake.” Before implementing the IFQ program the NPFMC, with the 
help of many researchers, NGOs, and fishermen, analyzed other IFQ programs around 
the globe. The intention was to create a hybrid program that would hopefully avoid many 
of the well-known problems that traditionally accompany resource privatization. Some of 
these problems include consolidation, sharecropping, and outside ownership. One 
subject, who was a member of both the NPFMC and the IPHC stated that: 
“And it was super controversial, and we tried to really build our program 
based on what we learned from the New Zealand program. To respond to the 
way corporations had taken over and consolidation of the quota had really 
pushed out the little guys…Sort of all the social caveats that are in place to 
try and protect the small boat fleet.”  
 
The seven safeguards of the Pacific halibut IFQ program are what sets it apart from other 
catch share programs. Additionally, area 2C (Southeast, AK), is one of the only 
management areas where these safeguards have not been vertically integrated and have 
remained intact. However, the vessel size categories safeguard was disregarded for this 
study because it is not unique to this program and the leasing provision included in the 
safeguards was disregarded because in area 2C catcher boats are barred from leasing 
quota. 
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 Each subject was asked their opinion concerning their perceived effectiveness of 
each safeguard. Additionally, they were asked if there were any ways they thought the 
safeguards could be improved or added to for the benefit of future fisheries. 
Owner on Board 
 
 The owner on board provision states that the owner of the halibut quota must be 
on board while that quota is being fished. According to subjects, the rate of return on 
quota investment is quite good from an outside perspective. As a result, investors were 
initially quite interested in purchasing quota, but the combination of these safeguards has 
prevented these ventures. Owner on board was intended to keep the fleet as an owner-
operator fleet. However, there are ways around this provision. For example, quota holders 
that have A-shares (freezer boat shares) may lease out their quota, initial recipients of 
quota are exempt from being on board, vessel investment of a certain level (20% in area 
2C) exempts the quota holder and medical transfers.165 There are many local terms for 
these types of quota holders including, absentee owners and slipper skippers.   
 Of the 31 subjects, 21 thought the owner on board safeguard was successful in 
accomplishing its goals, while 6 felt it was ineffective, and 4 did not state a clear 
preference (table 5). 
 Owner on Board Safeguard 
Successful 21 
Not Successful 6 
No Response 4 
Table 5: Subjects’ perceived effectiveness of the ‘owner on board’ safeguard. 
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The subjects who thought this provision was successful, stated reasons were the retention 
of a small boat fleet, a fisherman operated fishery, quota price control, quota turnover, 
safety, and the introduction of a form of inefficiency. Outside investment was a big fear 
when managers were developing the Pacific halibut IFQ program, but as one subject 
stated this safeguard helps combat this, while also contributing to price: 
“If you could invest in IFQ and not be part of the fishery, as in not get on the 
boat, the prices of IFQ would go through the roof because it’s a good 
investment. And the only reason why people don’t invest for the sake of 
investing is because they have to be there.”     
 
One subject presented an interesting perspective that the quota owner acts as a check 
system for safety. These individuals have to go out on a boat that they do not necessarily 
own and have to trust that it is going to deliver them home safely: 
“If you have to go out on the boats then you’re going to care about the safety 
and condition of the boat and so it helps improve the safety of it. And if you 
actually have to eat and sleep with the crew you kind of help with the pay 
scale on that, you know, so I think that's a good thing…the real value is in 
actually owning the quota…So, by having an owner on board you’re making 
sure that the value of the fishery stays with those who are actively fishing it.” 
 
Finally, subjects believed it would eventually lead to a turnover in quota. Now, those who 
have A-shares or were initial recipients do not have to be on board. However, initial 
recipients will eventually pass on and those who purchase their quota will not have this 
luxury. This means that when people get older and no longer want to be onboard, they 
will sell their quota to the next generation. Currently, on the contrary, initial recipients 
hoard their quota because they view it as a retirement fund that continues to collect value 
while they stay at home. 
 To this point, many subjects believed this safeguard was rendered ineffective due 
to all of the loopholes. These loopholes have resulted in the transformation of the fishery, 
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“I would argue that we are further and further away from an owner-operator. We started 
out as that primarily and we are barely even a shred of that anymore.” Beyond initial 
recipients, there are other loopholes that can be long-term: 
“That’s only in Southeast. It hasn't been that effective because the medical 
transfer has been so liberal. And it took me a while to figure out, I was kind 
of mad for a while, I was like how are all these guys fishing this quota and 
they don’t have the guys on board? And then I did a medical transfer and I 
figured out just what the deal was, where I think it’s three years per injury, so 
you say ‘oh my shoulder hurts’ for three years and then you go back and so 
‘oh it’s my knee’ and then you go back and ‘oh it’s my elbow,’ and there’s 
nine years right there with three different things. That has not been 
effective...In effect, it's made less quota available for transfer and probably 
pushed up the price. So, it hasn't helped young people get into the fishery, but 
it’s helped that old guy who’s been dependent on the fishery most of his life 
to keep making that money.” 
 
In addition to medical transfers, there is the ability to invest in the fishing vessel. This 
also allows you to skirt around the owner on board safeguard. 
 A few of the arguments that supported this safeguard asserted that owner on board 
had controlled the price per pound of halibut quota. Contrarily, many other subjects 
claimed the exact opposite:  
“The price of quota has gotten so high that the cost of servicing the debt on 
quota is higher than the cost of leasing quota. So…if you are a fisherman 
trying to get into the fisheries, if you are to follow the intent of owner on 
board, you are asked to spend more money on the quota than you would have 
to lease it. And until the, the uh, debt service is less on the quota, that is the 
correct opportunity to follow.” 
 
“I like the socio-economic effects of owner on board, but I don't think you 
can allocate the access to the resource and control the value of it. And 70 
dollar a pound halibut is overpriced. And somehow there is a view that 
somehow it is moral to pay Wells Fargo nearly all of your money, but it is 
immoral to pay that to another fisherman. And that’s where I find it 
interesting; the fishermen being the bank in my mind is not different, but 
people view it differently.” 
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Although these responses are mixed, fishermen generally believe the owner on 
board safeguard has been successful. Overwhelmingly, 3:1, subjects believe this 
provision is responsible for the retention of an owner-operated fleet. 
Block Plan 
 
 Originally, the block plan stated that blocks less than 20,000lbs could not be 
consolidated with other permits.166,167 The 20,000lbs threshold has come down 
considerably due to the cuts in quota and health of the halibut stock. Currently, the block 
plan bars individuals from owning more than 3 blocks of halibut quota. There are two 
types of quota, blocked and unblocked; blocked cannot be combined with other blocks, 
but unblocked can. As a result, unblocked quota provides fishermen with more flexibility 
and the ability to expand their ownership to a certain level. Previously, block ownership 
was limited to two blocks and some argue that block ownership should be decreased back 
to this level. The intention of the block program was to prevent excessive consolidation. 
Of the 31 subjects, 22 thought the block plan provision was successful in 
accomplishing its goals, while 6 felt it was unsuccessful, and 3 did not state a clear 
preference (table 6). 
 Block Plan Safeguard 
Successful 22 
Not Successful 6 
No Response 3 
Table 6: Subjects’ perceived effectiveness of the ‘block plan’ safeguard. 
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The block plan can serve as a hindrance and limit to consolidation. Restricting the 
number of blocks limits the amount quota and results in quota turnover. Over time, 
however, the size of unblocked that can be combined has increased. The process of 
combining smaller amounts of quota is called ‘sweep-ups.’ Originally, these small pieces 
were intended to provide affordable entrance into the fishery, but many fishermen 
claimed these were unworkable: 
“The sweep-up provision was just something that came about because a lot of 
people had little pieces of quota that weren't worth gearing up to go out for. 
So, to allow that small amount of consolidation was, I think, a good idea. 
And I personally bought little pieces and as the amounts that you’re allowed 
to sweep-up grew a little bit then that's how I kind of build mine.”    
 
Subjects also claimed that the block plan has been successful at maintaining a stratified 
fleet with a strong small boat presence: 
“The block proposal and the block system was a great idea…Because there’s 
all different sizes of operators and the big ones always want more, and the 
small ones are okay with a little.” 
 
Controlling consolidation in this manner levels the playing field between large operators 
and small operators, resulting in the retention of small boat operations. 
 Finally, those who believed the block plan to be successful stated that it 
introduces inefficiencies that result in quota turnover. If a big block of quota comes up for 
sale and a fisherman would like to buy it, they must first sell one of three of their smaller 
blocks in order to purchase the new block. Often times this is seen as a hindrance, but at 
the same time forces people to put quota on the market to move up. 
 The most common critiques and perceived failures of the block plan were thought 
to be due to the sweep-ups. Increasing sweep-up levels decreases the number of small 
blocks on the market or eliminates small blocks entirely. Small blocks may be 
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unworkable for those who own their own vessels and may have to justify the costs of 
operation. On the other hand, small blocks are a great way for crewmembers to build 
capital to invest in larger portions of quota. If a crewmember purchases quota, they can 
fish it on their captain’s boat. This is not only beneficial for the crewmember, but also the 
captain because it brings more quota on the vessel. Those who argue against the success 
of the block plan state that the scenario explained above is now unreachable due to 
excessive consolidation produced by sweep-ups: 
“You can’t afford [the blocks], you can’t afford a thousand pounds [now].” 
 
“My husband was one of the creators of the block amendment...and that’s 
helped, it has helped safeguard against consolidation, but now you have a 
really aging fleet. The average skipper age is probably mine, which is 
65...and young people can't afford to get in... It’s a huge problem now that, 
you know, reflects back that same thing that you consolidated wealth.” 
 
According to an Alaska-based quota brokerage, the last 2C halibut sold was B-class quota 
and sold for $65.00/lb.168 The maximum sweep-up limit in area 2C is 1,999lbs.169 If you 
were able to purchase a small block of 1,999lbs, this would cost you $129,935. The 
average weight of a single halibut in area 2C is approximately 30lbs.170 This means you 
would max out your quota with about 66 fish. The current dock price is around $5.50 per 
pound for halibut. One fisherman estimated that between 65-75% of the money leaves the 
boat for expenses; fuel, crew, maintenance, licensing fees, ice, food, bait, etc. If you only 
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pocketed 35%, without interest, it would take about 34 years to pay off one small block. 
This means halibut quota is a long-term investment, but how is one able to sustain their 
operation on a small or non-existent profit margin? And how are young people able to 
justify investing in an expensive market that is not guaranteed to retain value over time? 
After all quota shares are a percentage of the TAC, they are not set in stone. As noted by 
several fishermen they have taken many cuts, one which was around 75% of the TAC. 
These questions will be addressed in following chapters. 
Sea Day Requirement 
 
The sea day requirement states that only crewmembers or initial quota share 
recipients with 150 days of experience in a U.S. fishery may buy quota.171,172 The key 
phrase here is ‘U.S. fishery.’ This means that fishermen who are not Alaskan residents 
may own Alaska Pacific halibut quota. According to NMFS, in 2018, there were 2,575 
IFQ permits for halibut/sablefish and CDQ halibut IFQ permits combined.173 Of the 2,575 
quota shareholders, 1,945 have registered addresses in Alaska.174 Of the remaining 621 
permits, 389 were registered to Washington state addresses and 104 were registered to 
Oregon state addresses.175 The remaining 128 permits were registered to varying states 
including, but not limited to, Massachusetts, Florida, Hawaii, Colorado, Maine, and 
                                                 
171 Knapp, G. 1996. Alaska Halibut Captains’ Attitudes Towards IFQs. Marine Resource Economics. 11(1): 
43–55. 
172 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council, 1-17. https://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/ 
173 Permits and Licenses [Internet]. Anchorage and Juneau (AK): NOAA Fisheries Alaska Regional Office; 
2018 [cited 2019 Feb 18]. Available from alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/permits-
licenses?field_fishery_pm_value=Individual%2BFishing%2BQuota%2B%28IFQ%29%2BHalibut%2FSab
lefish%2Band%2BCDQ%2BHalibut%2BIFQ 
174 I.d. 
175 I.d. 
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Arizona.176 Finally, of the 2,575 permits, 80 were registered to an incorporated company 
or corporation.177 Of the 80 corporations, 26 were located in Alaska, 41 in Washington, 8 
in Oregon, and 5 between California, Montana, Wyoming, and Utah.178 According to 
Pautzke and Oliver (1997), the original intent of these safeguards was to maintain an 
owner-operated fleet and prevent absentee corporation ownership.179 However, there were 
corporations that were the initial recipients of quota.180 Additionally, corporations and 
partnerships are permitted to purchase catcher vessel quota if they received an initial 
allocation of quota shares.181  
 Seemingly, it may have made more sense to limit the ownership of Pacific halibut 
IFQs to Alaska residents, but this would be in direct violation of the Interstate Commerce 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.182 The Interstate Commerce Clause prevents the creation 
of state policies that favor state citizens and businesses at the expense of non-citizens that 
conduct business within the state.183 One subject commented on the discrepancy between 
non-resident and resident permits: 
“There’s a lot of heavy hitters from down south. If you look at the uh CFEC 
table of income by permit, they break it down between resident and 
nonresident, nonresidents beat them every time...Interstate commerce clause, 
thou shalt not make rules that at a federal level make preference to one state 
over another.” 
                                                 
176 Permits and Licenses [Internet]. Anchorage and Juneau (AK): NOAA Fisheries Alaska Regional Office; 
2018 [cited 2019 Feb 18]. Available from alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/permits-
licenses?field_fishery_pm_value=Individual%2BFishing%2BQuota%2B%28IFQ%29%2BHalibut%2FSab
lefish%2Band%2BCDQ%2BHalibut%2BIFQ 
177 I.d. 
178 I.d. 
179 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council, 1-17. https://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/ 
180 I.d. 
181 I.d. 
182 Commerce Clause [Internet]. Ithaca (NY): Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School; 2018 Sept 
[cited on Feb 21]. Available from www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause 
183 I.d. 
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Of the 31 subjects, 20 thought the 150 sea days provision was successful at 
keeping quota in the hands of fishermen and preventing absentee ownership, while 4 felt 
it was unsuccessful, and 7 did not state a clear preference (table 7). 
 Sea Day Safeguard 
Successful 20 
Not Successful 4 
No Response 7 
Table 7: Subjects’ perceived effectiveness of the ‘sea day requirement’ safeguard. 
 
Many subjects thought that this safeguard was effective, but the tracking and 
verifying of sea days is elusive and there are no guidelines for how to do so. Of those 
who thought this safeguard was successful, they stated that 150 days of experience in a 
U.S. fishery paired with the owner on board clause prevents non-fishermen from 
investing in the industry. But how do you define fishing experience? And how do you 
define fisherman?: 
“If they’re trying to drill down to what is actually fishing...If somebody is a 
slipper skipper or a walk-on, are they actually a fisherman? But we have 
permit holders that come on the boat and they’re out on the ocean and they're 
either observing or you know ripping gills on deck. And if they come along 
and say that isn't a fisherman then they are going to get down to a physical 
test of how much work are you doing, and it gets really confusing. So, I think 
that the original intent of that safeguard is effective, but when they try to 
revisit it on an ongoing term it gets sticky. And that was one of the IFQ 
committee issues of trying to weed out walk-ons, but if somebody has a quota 
share and is missing a leg and you try to say you aren't a fisherman anymore, 
good luck on that.” 
 
These questions are complicated and convoluted. After all, the MSFCMA doesn't even 
define the term fisherman.184 
                                                 
184 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801-1891, at pgs. 4-12 
(d)) 
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 Additionally, some subjects stated this clause was successful because it required 
quota holders to be U.S. citizens, whereas other Alaska fishing permits do not: 
“The big thing that is very interesting is that you have to be a US citizen. 
Now one of my friends fished here for 22 years, in order for him to get his 
IFQ quota he had to become a US citizen. He wasn't, he was a swiss…He 
said, ‘I’m glad it happened, I’ve always been meaning to do it, but I needed 
something to kick me in the butt to do it.’ So that was a good thing, whereas a 
lot of permits and stuff, you do not have to be, State of Alaska permits, you 
do not have to be a U.S. citizen to own a state of Alaska permit.” 
 
 Those who thought the 150 sea days safeguard had been unsuccessful in keeping 
the quota in the hands of halibut fishermen argue two flaws in particular. One is that this 
clause does not specify experience in a certain fishery. This means that fishermen who are 
involved in other, more profitable, fisheries can swoop in and buy quota: 
“Why should some guy who had a windfall of millions of dollars [in the 
Bering Sea crab fishery] come impact me because he has 150 sea days and 
wants to ride along. I used to think [the 150 sea days] was a good thing, but I 
think it’s pretty useless right now. It’s better than nothing, at least you could 
say I was a fisherman at one time.” 
 
The second is that the 150 sea days cutoff is arbitrary and essentially meaningless 
because there is no genuine way to track this and verify the authenticity: 
“Back in the day when you were first able to apply for you know the ability 
to buy quota, we were all just deckhands and our skipper said, ‘hey go fill 
this paperwork out.’ And back then I don’t think that anybody was really 
keeping an eye on whether you, I mean nobody asked me about how many 
hours I’d had, I just received the certificate.” 
 
Regardless, the majority of subjects still felt that the sea day requirement is successful 
and better than the alternative of nothing at all. 
Ownership Caps 
 
 Ownership caps were intended to restrict the amount of quota one individual 
could own and the amount of quota one vessel could fish. This distinction between 
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individual and vessel is important in this case because the thresholds are different. The 
cap for individuals in area 2C (Southeast, Alaska) is 0.5% of the TAC and the cap for 
vessels in area 2C is 1% of the TAC. 
 Of the 31 subjects, 20 thought ownership caps were successful in accomplishing 
their goals, while 3 felt they were unsuccessful, and 8 did not state a clear preference 
(table 8).  
 
 Ownership caps are critical when discussing fishing operations. For example, an 
individual can only fish 0.5%, but may be on a boat with other quota holders and when 
combined they cap the vessel out at 1%. Rather than taking out more than one vessel, 
they fish all of the quota on a shared vessel. This example implies that the quota holders 
are onboard the vessel, but this isn’t always the case. Fishermen, however, are innovative 
and find ways to make the vessel caps work for them. Rather than investing in and having 
the overhead of owning quota, fishermen purchase multiple vessels to bring quota holders 
on. 
Many of the subjects of this research believe the ownership caps have been 
successful at preventing consolidation. The amount of consolidation varies from area to 
area based on the parameters set for the cap. This is another thing that makes Southeast, 
Alaska unique and arguably more successful: 
“The most important thing we should have done was put that cap on an area 
like we did in Southeast. Whereas a half of a percent of an area rather than a 
half a percent of all of Alaska that you can take out of one area...Having your 
 Ownership Caps Safeguard 
Successful 20 
Not Successful 3 
No Response 8 
Table 8: Subjects’ perceived effectiveness of the ‘ownership caps’ safeguard. 
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vessel use caps by area I think really helps tie the solution to the area you’re 
talking about. And you can have different ones for different areas.” 
 
 The main criticism of the ownership cap safeguard is that 0.5% is far too high. If 
the ownership caps were lowered it would further distribute wealth and quota to more 
people. It would also require more vessels because each individual vessel would be 
capped out more quickly. Additionally, it would keep vessels smaller because a large boat 
is unnecessary to land a smaller amount of quota. More vessels would mean more gear 
must be purchased, more crew must be hired, and more supplies brought on board. If the 
intent of the ownership cap safeguards was truly to prevent consolidation, retain more 
jobs, and keep small boats operating, then it would be best to lower this cap. Simply, a 
smaller cap would support more boats, create less consolidation, and generate more jobs. 
 Overall, the majority of subjects surveyed for this research believe owner caps are 
successful, but most agree that it might benefit the industry and Alaska to lower the cap. 
Buydown Amendment 
 The buydown amendment utilizes the separation of vessel classes (A, B. C. D) 
and is intended to widen the quota pool for smaller vessels.185 For example, D-class 
vessels can fish B, C, and D-class quota, C-class vessels can fish B and C-class quota, B-
class vessels and fish B-class quota, and A-class vessels may only fish A-class quota. 
Southeast Alaska is the only area that has not blurred the lines between vessel classes for 
the buydown amendment:  
“When the program was first approved it couldn't go down or up. We later 
changed it to allow it to go down. And in this area [2C] that’s still the way it 
is. But in some of the other areas [the] line dividing between C and D has 
been eliminated so that’s all one category.” 
                                                 
185 Pautzke, C.G., Oliver, C.W. 1997. Development of the Individual Fishing Quota Program. North Pacific 
Fishery Management Council, 1-17, 7. https://www.npfmc.org/ifqpaper/ 
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This is yet again another reason why area 2C is a unique management area to study. 
According to Dawson (2005), the policy objective of the Pacific halibut IFQ plan and the 
block amendment in, particular, was the prevent “a full-scale reorganization of the fleet, 
which might result in larger vessels dominating quota at the expense of smaller 
vessels.”186 In area 2C vertical integration has not been implemented, which has benefited 
the area, but this is not the case in other management areas. According to Dawson (2005), 
vertical integration is a mark of failure for an IFQ program. 
 Buydown Amendment 
Successful 19 
Not Successful 5 
No Response 7 
Table 9: Subjects’ perceived effectiveness of the buydown amendment. 
 
 Of the 31 subjects, 19 thought the buydown amendment was successful in 
accomplishing its goals, while 5 felt it was ineffective, and 7 did not state a clear 
preference (table 9). Of the subjects surveyed that owned boats, most owned C-class 
vessels, which may have skewed the results concerning the buydown amendment. 
Overwhelmingly subjects approved of this amendment because it widens the pool of 
quota available to smaller boats, while barring larger boats from buying small boat quota. 
Presumably, this keeps competition for quota between smaller operations, which in turn 
should be reflected in the price. 
 Seemingly, it is cheaper and more manageable to own a C-class vessel compared 
to higher vessel classes. Additionally, C-class vessels can purchase quota from both C 
                                                 
186 Dawson, R. 2005. Vertical Integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery. Marine Policy. 30(4): 341-346, at 
pg. 7. 
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and B-class pools. These two factors combined may increase the C-class fleet and in turn 
have unintended consequences for B-class vessel owners. Two B-class vessel owners that 
were interviewed spoke to the negative impacts of this amendment on B-class vessel 
owners: 
“Another thing is you could fish down but not up, so everybody who could 
afford to buy quota well they just bought A-class and B-class and fishing it 
on their C-class boats. So that eliminated a whole class of boats...So the B-
class got kind of totally wiped out by the C-class holders...So even if I 
wanted to get into the quota system, I don’t think I could even buy B-class, 
there’s not much available.” 
 
“Out here it took away any reason to own a B-class vessel. So, if you have a 
B-class boat now you are just pulling just off the B-class pool. If you have a 
C-class boat you were previously just pulling off of C, but now you can pull 
off of C and B.” 
 
If more B-class vessel owners were interviewed these results may have been different. In 
order to fully understand the implications of the buydown amendment future research 
should include a larger variety of vessel class owners. 
 Additionally, as stated previously, fishermen are innovative, and often times will 
find ways around what they regard as excessive regulation. The excessive regulation, in 
this case, being vessel size, which is delineated based on only length. This can create 
safety issues as unseaworthy vessels are constructed to create larger vessels that can hold 
more fish, while still fitting within a smaller vessel size class: 
“It [The buydown amendment] benefits smaller boats a little bit, but we also 
do have the super 58s, I have one of those, 58x26 feet wide, which is not a 
small boat anymore. It’s legislated inefficiency.” 
 
 Overall, the buydown amendment is extremely important and relatively successful 
in the general sense of large boats versus small boats. Generalities aside, may it have been 
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better to not have allowed buying down or up? This would have further restricted 
competition within each of the individual vessel classes. It is difficult to project what 
impact this may have had on fleet size, quota price, and safeguard satisfaction.  However, 
before the program was changed and vertical integration was avoided, market 
transactions increased.187 In the end, being able to only buy down is still far more 
beneficial than being able to buy down and up. In this case, where only buying down is 
permitted, a large portion of B-class quota is fished on lower class vessels, but one can 
speculate that if buying up was permitted this would have eliminated much if not all of 
the smaller class quota.  
Conclusions 
 
 Overall, regardless of quota status and vessel size, it seemed to be agreed upon 
among the research subjects surveyed, that the safeguards have been effective and 
successful in accomplishing their goals and preserving the Pacific halibut IFQ small boat 
fishery. Nevertheless, during interviews, many fishermen suggested ways in which the 
safeguards could be improved. Many scenarios were suggested for improvement within 
the bounds of the Pacific halibut IFQ program and ways in which the program should be 
improved before it could be implemented elsewhere. These improvements and 
modifications are discussed in the following chapter. 
                                                 
187 Dawson, R. 2005. Vertical Integration in the post-IFQ halibut fishery. Marine Policy. 30(4): 341-346. 
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MODIFICATIONS, CHANGES, AND IMPROVEMENTS TO IFQS 
 
One of the main goals of this research was to cultivate ideas for improvement, 
both for the current Pacific halibut IFQ system and IFQ management schemes in general. 
The current Pacific halibut IFQ management plan has been in place for over two decades 
and the majority of the people interviewed were involved with either the development of 
the program, were initial recipients, were fishing in the community when IFQs were 
implemented and/or come from generations of fishermen. As such the individuals 
interviewed for this study should be considered experts in the field. Expertise built on 
years of real-world experience and working within the system. 
 Each subject was asked if they thought the IFQ system or its safeguards could be 
improved upon, modified or added to. Suggestions focused on limited 
entry/transferability, out of state ownership, initial allocation, ecosystem-based fisheries 
management (EBFM), leasing, owner on board, and community quota entities (CQEs). 
Limited Entry/Transferability  
 
 Numerous subjects suggested a modified system of limited entry. The three 
important facets to the suggested system are leasing, perpetuity, and transferability. 
Several subjects stated that the program would have had entirely different outcomes had 
leasing been permitted or the permits were non-transferrable. If the permits were non-
transferrable, they could not be bought and sold on an open market. This in turn would 
lower the associated price of quota.  
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Out of State Ownership 
 
 As discussed in previous chapters, handling out of state ownership of quota is 
elusive and hard to address because of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Additionally, 
Pacific halibut is managed federally, not at the state level. Regardless, numerous 
fishermen expressed interest in addressing the disparity between out of state and in state 
ownership. Perhaps, instead of directly discriminating against non-residents of Alaska by 
barring them from owning quota, a limit could be placed on the amount of quota allowed 
to be held out of state. Concerned subjects stated that they thought the number of out of 
state permits was harming the state of Alaska because that income exits the state. Simply 
put, once the quota and associated revenue leave Alaska, there is no guaranteed way to 
capture some of that within the state. It would be very difficult to mediate this problem 
without addressing federal law. 
Initial Allocation 
 
 One of the leading criticisms of the current Pacific halibut IFQ program was the 
manner in which the initial allocation took place. The qualifying years to many were 
seemingly narrow and arbitrary. Additionally, another principal criticism is that these 
permits were gifted for free and in perpetuity. One suggestion included spreading out the 
initial quota allocation beyond just those who had fishing history from a few select years: 
“You know, if anything, the initial allocation of quota share, you know if a 
program was to be designed again, I would probably be in favor of a 
somewhat different initial allocation and not the big windfall for the people 
who had the history during those years and maybe spread it out a little more 
to the people who participated…anyways it’s going to be a windfall but I 
guess spread it out a little more and don’t concentrate it so much on that 
narrow qualifying period.” 
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Instead of gifting away the quota, it also could have been sold. The opportunity to 
initially buy the quota could be controlled within either a lottery or auction 
framework.188 This would avoid the ‘great giveaway of quota’: 
“I mean why did my dad deserve to get that quota? Just because we were 
there in the golden era? We were just there in the qualifying years, he was 
just the right age at the right time. And that gave him rights to that stuff 
forever? I mean they could have not given it to the fishermen and sold it to 
them...I think the idea was kind of to set up this free market, tradeable, kind 
of like a stock thing. Everyone kind of liked that, it was kind of going with 
the politics of the era or something. But it didn't all have to be given to these 
people. 
 
“I mean it’s hard to pick winners and losers, that’s where if the government 
would have sold it to these people at the get-go then I think it would have 
started at more of a level playing field. And then you could have had a chunk 
of money and set up an endowment like what a lot of universities have going 
on for management…Since you’re not making any more quota now, to get 
young people in you gotta take quota from the people that got it, or you have 
to have lots of outside money, state or federal dollars, that would buy that 
quota and offer it to young people below market rates. Some kind of 
subsidized form of entry. I think all that would do is drive up the price 
more…Suddenly you’re in an artificial market” 
 
These suggestions should be included in the proposals for future quota share programs. 
We see no plausible reason for why multiple distribution methods should not be 
considered that address both price and equity. 
EBFM 
Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) is a place-based tool that 
manages multiple stocks, while also considering ecosystems dynamics, habitat, and 
abiotic factors.189 It is considered a more holistic approach to resource management and 
                                                 
188 Bromley, D.W., Macinko, S. 2007. Rethinking Fisheries Policy in Alaska: Options for the Future. 
Prepared for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Juneau, Alaska. 
189 Fogarty, M.J. 2014. The art of ecosystem-based fishery management. Canadian Journal of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Science. 71: 479-490. 
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allocation.190 EBFM for Pacific halibut would consider spawning grounds, migration 
patterns, other fisheries, predator/prey interactions, bycatch, etc. EBFM could be 
incorporated within the current IFQ system but would require the cooperation and 
assistance of many working groups and fisheries representatives. One subject stated the 
need for this: 
“Yeah if I was going to change anything on the IFQ system, really this would 
be for all fisheries the herring, mean all of them, a fishery shouldn't just count 
for the only fish they’re catching, it should count for all fish they effect. 
Whether that be a feeding fish like herring or halibut where they’re killing the 
young, fisheries should account for everything So if [trawling is] affecting 
other fisheries, it should affect what they can do.” 
 
EBFM is gaining in popularity, but can be extremely difficult to implement, especially in 
developed fisheries. However, the potential benefits of such a system are considerable. 
Leasing 
 
 Under the current IFQ system in area 2C leasing of B, C, and D quota is 
forbidden. Many of the current safeguards directly address and prohibit leasing. 
However, some subjects argue that leasing would allow an avenue for fishermen who do 
not possess or cannot afford quota, to participate in the fishery. One fisherman explains 
the opportunities associated with leasing: 
“I think that leasing is the opportunity and I think that should be planned on 
in an IFQ system, rather than trying to control it to make it more complicated. 
If they try to destroy the hired skipper clause you will force the quota holders 
to actually become the lender. And the difference between a hired skipper 
quota holder and a bank, is the bank or a conventional note can be passed 
down through generations. That right now, the hired skipper ends with those 
quota holders, but if they force them out of the current system and into an 
actual loan arrangement with the harvest boats then those people will actually 
be able to hand that debt off to their heirs and it will go for decades longer…I 
just think that if you leave the quota on the open market you end up at this 
                                                 
190 Fogarty, M.J. 2014. The art of ecosystem-based fishery management. Canadian Journal of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Science. 71: 479-490. 
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position where you’re looking at leasing or you're looking at Wells Fargo. 
And which is the lesser of two evils?” 
 
In the situation explained above safeguards would still have to be put in place to prevent 
non-fishermen or corporations from investing in quota. The benefits described above only 
exists if the loan arrangement is between two members of the industry. Despite the 
opportunities explained by the subject above, managers should be wary of leasing 
because it could result in decreased quota ownership and turnover among subjects. 
Private leasing also has to potential to unleash a Pandora’s box of other socially 
damaging problems. 
Owner on Board 
 
 Several arguments were made against the current owner on board provision that 
exists in the Pacific halibut IFQ program. Numerous individuals were unhappy with the 
loopholes surrounding this clause, as well as the trickle-down effects that come with 
having the owner on board. One fisherman who was instrumental in developing and 
instituting the safeguards as both a member of the NPFMC and IPHC discussed the 
regrets they had concerning this provision: 
“Yeah to me [owner on board] is essential. And that's where we made a 
mistake...We thought we were maintaining an owner-operated fleet, we knew 
there was a little loophole to allow people who were initial recipients to use a 
hired skipper, we had no idea how big a loophole that was and how much 
that’s changed the fleet. So I would, if I could do it again or if I could make a 
change, and we already have changed to really limit that into the future, so to 
get to that second generation where everybody has to be on board, but I 
would have fought harder...If I could do it again, if it was up to me, I would 
not allow that kind of a loophole.” 
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 One of the trickle-down impacts discussed was the loss of crew jobs from ride-a-
longs. Quota holders who work on deck eliminate crew jobs from an already limited pool. 
It’s a win, win for the skipper however because they do not have to invest in quota or pay 
an additional crew member. In turn, this makes the profits earned by both more 
significant. 
 Loopholes for owner on board cause fishermen to hold onto quota longer. Why 
wouldn't you hold onto quota if you can reap the benefits and build a retirement fund 
without having to be on board? This negatively impacts the industry as a whole because 
quota turnover is important for battling the greying of the fleet. Evasion and manipulation 
of owner on board will be further discussed in following chapters.  
CQEs 
 
 Community quota entities (CQEs) are similar to quota banks. The purpose of a 
quota bank is to create an intermediate step between crewing and buying quota: 
“Part of what we want to do with the fishery trust is to help the CQEs to 
work. So there is that intermediate between deck handing and not being able 
to afford your own quota, to owning your own quota where you could fish if 
the CQEs held the quota and you could get your boat and get your fishing 
history and fish some quota and then jump off into ownership…The 
community quota entity...are a subsequent action by the council to allow 
remote communities, small remote communities, so they have to be off the 
road system and less than 1,500 people I think it is, to become an entity, to 
form an entity to buy quota...Everybody else has to be an individual. And we 
were lukewarm on the idea at first because it’s one more group to, like 
compete for quota, which it always drives up the price, but I guess 
increasingly to my view there needs to be some kind of support, some kind of 
bootstrapping helping the next generation. So, our trust is on helping 
individuals if CQEs can get to a reasonable level and help people transition to 
ownership might be a needed step. But that’s still really controversial and 
with a lot of people worried about how it affects ownership over time and 
price of quota.” 
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The idea here is that CQEs could be applied beyond just remote communities. As stated 
by this subject, the notion, however, is very controversial. The suggested pool of quota 
has to be bought by some agency as quota comes up on the market or reallocated through 
the removal of quota from current quota holders. One fisherman stated that they felt quota 
banks would be severely unfair because without banks the ones that are willing to take the 
risk of investment are usually fully vested in the fishery and community: 
“None of it comes easy, it takes time and I get the impression a fair number 
of new fishermen don't fully understand the commitment it takes to make it. 
Tying up more pounds in this manner does not seem fair to those willing to 
put in the time for long term goals.”  
 
There are both drawbacks and benefits associated with quota banks. In reality, the 
competition created by pooling quota could be controlled and it would address one of the 
major issues facing the Pacific halibut fishery today, which is entry. The greying of the 
fleet and obstacles to entry will be further discussed in following chapters. 
Conclusions 
 
 Overall, this research was successful in probing those involved with the Pacific 
halibut fishery for suggested modifications, additions, and improvements to the current 
IFQ system. Some of these suggestions are extremely innovative and should be 
considered moving forward. Management alternatives beyond the realm of IFQs will be 
discussed in the following chapters and will be mainly based on literature review. The 
suggestions above are indispensable because they are based on the opinions of expert 
fishermen who work within the IFQ system in their daily lives. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO IFQS 
 
 
Unites States catch share programs, such as IFQs, were popularized in the mid-
1990s, starting with the Alaska halibut fishery in 1995.191 Several fisheries followed suit, 
including Pacific whiting (1997), Alaska pollock (1999), Bering Sea and Aleutian Island 
King and Tanner crab (2005), Gulf of Mexico red snapper (2007), Atlantic sea scallop 
(2010), Gulf of Mexico grouper and tilefish (2010), mid-Atlantic tile fish (2010), and 
Northeast multispecies groundfish (2010).192 According to Criddle and Macinko (2000), 
IFQs were promoted due to the failures of limited entry systems in the 1970s to capture 
sufficient available rent.193 By turning the focus from input to output controls, economists 
were able to increase efficiency gains.194 
 The Pacific halibut fishing industry was extremely unsafe and wasteful in the 
early 1990s. An immeasurable amount of halibut was being discarded, fishermen were 
dying, gear was being discarded, the season had become extremely stunted, and the 
quality of the halibut was exceptionally poor. Managers and fishermen felt as though 
something had to be done quickly before the whole system imploded. Since then, IFQs 
have been in place in the Pacific halibut fishery. It is usually claimed that the IFQ system 
has been in place for such a long period of time and an immense amount of investment 
                                                 
191 Grimm, D., Barkhorn, I., Festa, D., Bonzon, K., Boomhower, J., Hovland, V., Blau, J. 2012. Assessing 
catch shares’ effects evidence from Federal United States and associated British Columbian fisheries. 
Marine Policy. 36(3): 644-657. 
192 I.d. 
193 Criddle, K.R., Macinko, S. 2000. A requiem for the IFQ in US fisheries? Marine Policy. 24: 461-469. 
194 I.d. 
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has been consigned on the current system that it seems hard to remove or reform. 
However, over time it has become clear that social inequalities and rent-seeking behavior 
are tarnishing the image of the IFQ program.195 Additionally, the greying of the fleet and 
barriers to entry are presenting new problems to a program that may have reached its 
expiration date. Several ideas for programs that would allow for the transition away from 
IFQs are emerging and should be considered before the current system becomes 
completely unworkable. 
 The state of the Pacific halibut fishery when IFQs were implemented was so 
disastrous and was unlike anything else we see today. This should be taken into account 
when considering IFQ management in the future. The IFQ system ‘works’ with Alaska 
halibut because of the unique state the fishery was in and the safeguards that were put in 
place to try and protect the small boat fleet. Outside of the specialized bubble that is the 
Alaska halibut fishery, the overwhelming consensus is that the social inequities of IFQ 
programs outweigh the economic gains.196 Excessive consolidation has many unintended 
consequences and, in the end, when the season was extended immensely high levels of 
consolidation were not required to avoid safety and gear conflicts. We recommend that 
all available management options be exhausted before privatization schemes are 
considered. Some of the available management options include exhausting traditional 
management tools, fishing cooperatives, a lay-up system, and non-transferable quota 
                                                 
195 Criddle, K.R., Macinko, S. 2000. A requiem for the IFQ in US fisheries? Marine Policy. 24: 461-469. 
196 Pinkerton, E. 2013. Alternatives to ITQs in equity-efficiency-effectiveness trade-offs: How the lay-up 
system spread effort in the BC halibut fishery. Marine Policy. 42: 5-13. 
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programs.197,198,199 The aim of all of these restrictions is to limit the profit-maximizing 
actions of fishermen, therefore decreasing efficiency. After all, successfully managing 
fish stocks means successfully managing the actions of harvesters. 
                                                 
197 Criddle, K.R., Macinko, S. 2000. A requiem for the IFQ in US fisheries? Marine Policy. 24: 461-469. 
198 Pinkerton, E. 2013. Alternatives to ITQs in equity-efficiency-effectiveness trade-offs: How the lay-up 
system spread effort in the BC halibut fishery. Marine Policy. 42: 5-13. 
199 Bromley, D.W., Macinko, S. 2007. Rethinking Fisheries Policy in Alaska: Options for the Future. 
Prepared for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Juneau, Alaska: 1-38. 
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UTILIZE MORE OF THE TRADITIONAL TOOLKIT 
 
The traditional toolkit in fisheries management usually consists of things like gear 
limits (fishing gear, boat length, etc.), closed seasons, and size/sex limitations.200 We 
would like to suggest additions to the toolkit, outside the box of what is traditionally 
used. Namely, the addition of gear limitations on shaft horsepower, size of propellers, 
and the number of propellers. A problem experienced with limiting vessel length is that 
fishermen expand their vessels in other dimensions (breadth, draft) to avoid a decrease in 
efficiency. However, moving large vessels proficiently, quickly, and safely through the 
water is directly dependent on the source of power used to move the vessel. Larger, 
heavier vessels require more shaft horsepower, larger propellers, or numerous propellers. 
Vessel propeller size can also create cavitation, which can cause a vessel to move less 
efficiently. For example, according to one subject, in trawl fisheries, the size of the net 
that can be pulled is directly dependent on shaft horsepower. Coupling limitations on 
shaft horsepower, propeller size, propeller pitch, and the number of propellers with vessel 
dimension restrictions could successfully limit efficiency in a fishery. 
Another way in which the traditional toolkit could be utilized is by adding more 
specific temporal gear limitations. For example, in longline fisheries, the number of sets 
permitted for each vessel could be limited with regard to time (per day or per week). 
Inherently, limitations on the length of sets and number of hooks would have to 
accompany this kind of regulation.  
                                                 
200 Wilson, J. 1993. Self-Governance in the Maine Lobster Fishery. World Wildlife Fund, Gland 
Switzerland.  
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FISHING COOPERATIVES 
 
Fishing cooperatives group fishermen into coalitions that fish a portion of the 
catch as a cooperative. Rather than assigning catch to individuals, catch is assigned to the 
cooperative and it is the decision of the cooperative how to divide it. According to 
Criddle and Macinko (2000), “Cooperative members depend on civil law to enforce 
contracts that partition the catch among a limited set of participants and rely on 
government to enforce usufructuary rights to a fraction of the resource.”201 Simply put, 
the cooperatives are allowed access to the benefits of the public’s property, yet it is not 
owned by the cooperative or its members. This eliminates share concentration, absentee 
ownership, leasing, and transferability202. In other words, all of these externalities are 
internalized by fishing cooperatives because they compartmentalize small groups of 
subjects.203 The lack of ownership and cooperation fostered by cooperatives is thought to 
promote resource stewardship more successfully than privatization.204   
                                                 
201 Criddle, K.R., Macinko, S. 2000. A requiem for the IFQ in US fisheries? Marine Policy. 24: 461-469, at 
pg. 462. 
202 I.d. 
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204 I.d. 
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LAY-UP SYSTEM 
 
British Columbia’s halibut fishery operated successfully under a vessel lay-up 
system for forty years.205 The lay-up system retained an extended season that lasted for 
100-250 days and fostered an environment of co-management.206 Co-management was 
utilized for rulemaking, enforcement, and monitoring.207 Fishermen prevented the race 
for fish seen in the Alaska halibut fishery by simply utilizing gear and time limitations.208 
 Under the British Columbia halibut lay-up system, rules required that fishermen 
stop fishing or lay-up their vessels for 6-10 days after a fish delivery.209 Deliveries 
became naturally staggered and allowed fishermen to take time off for important holidays 
and leisure activities.210 As demonstrated by Abernethy, et al. (2007) leisure activities are 
a significant driver of fishermen behavior.211 Utilizing and building this into management 
had a natural effect of extending the season and satisfaction with management. The 
accompanying rules of the lay-up program were intentionally kept simple and short 
enough to fit front and back on one piece of paper.212 The lay-up system utilized in New 
Hampshire’s groundfish fisheries also used a limit on fishing days.213 Funding for this 
program, the meetings, enforcement, and overall coordination came from the fishermen 
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themselves. They paid a small fee for every 1,000lbs of halibut they delivered.214 The 
lay-up system was respected and supported by fishermen, economists, and managers due 
to impacts on the supply chain, the extended season, upward pressure on prices, balance 
among fleet sectors (vessel size), increased time for leisure and repairs, and fishermen 
involvement in rulemaking.215 
                                                 
214 Pinkerton, E. 2013. Alternatives to ITQs in equity-efficiency-effectiveness trade-offs: How the lay-up 
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NON-TRANSFERABLE QUOTA PROGRAM 
 
A non-transferable quota program was suggested by many subjects as a viable 
option to decrease effort. In such a program the permit is not owned by an individual, but 
rather is presented as a usufructuary right.216 The permit would be leased from a 
governmental organization such as NMFS. These leased permits would have a fixed term, 
where at the end of the term they were returned.217 The permits could be initially 
allocated based on catch history, or a limited number of equal permits parceled out to be 
distributed by auction or lottery.218 The latter lottery distribution method means that each 
subject has an equal chance of receiving a permit. The ‘expiration date’ on the permits 
would have to be staggered and then redistributed also using an auction or lottery 
system.219 The permits could be available at this time to vessel owners, skippers, crew, 
processors, or local communities.220 The permits could also be coupled with a use it or 
lose it provision to ensure active participation.221 Moreover, revenue from leasing and 
royalties could be used for enforcement, community infrastructure, or as a method of 
transition from IFQ management. In other words, the new leased interest could be used to 
buyout historic participants, given the transition period was sufficient in length.222 Once 
all subjects were transitioned into the system, the interest could be used for other 
community or fishery-related betterments. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The above management suggestions only scrape the surface. Many alternatives 
exist if managers are willing to think outside the box and craft schemes that are 
specialized and based on the fishery, area, participants, stock health, environmental 
factors, and tradition. It should go without saying that these alternatives focus on the 
management of harvesters and each can be placed within an ecosystem-based fisheries 
management framework. Current management systems have a grip on the public mind, 
limiting creativity for the future. We must step outside of this and consider more holistic 
approaches that encompass social, environmental, and economic facets.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
FUTURE WORK 
 
 The original intent of this research was to gauge contemporary, general 
satisfaction with the Pacific halibut IFQ program, effectiveness of the safeguards, find 
ways to improve the current program, and to suggest management alternatives to IFQ 
management. However, these interviews brought to light a number of issues currently 
facing the IFQ system that were not addressed in the interview questions, but that 
subjects felt strongly needed to be included. IFQ management and the safeguards are 
clearly important to Alaskan coastal communities, but it would be a severe injustice to 
overlook contemporary issues facing these communities. As the Pacific halibut IFQ 
program has developed over the last two decades several issues have arisen that should be 
addressed. These problems are nuanced and may not be experienced in similar programs 
of younger maturity. The pertinent concerns shared by many subjects revolved around 
IFQ balloon effects, barriers to entry, evasion of the owner on board safeguard, evasion 
of the ownership safeguard, trawling, the charter fleet reallocation, and climate change. 
These concerns and the information laid out in sections should guide future research in 
the field of fisheries management.  
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IFQ BALLOON EFFECTS 
 
A common critique of and current problem with the Pacific halibut IFQ program 
is that the management scheme has caused a balloon effect of effort on the salmon troll 
fishery in Sitka. This is evident even in just the disparities between the number of halibut 
permits held versus the number of salmon troll permits held. Currently (2019) in Sitka 
there are 125 commercial halibut permits, compared to 382 commercial salmon troll 
permits (power and hand).223 There are over three times as many more active salmon 
permits than halibut permits in Sitka. 
When Pacific halibut IFQs were first implemented many who were not initially 
allocated quota turned to salmon trolling as a way to diversify their income. To many, 
purchasing a vessel, gear, hiring a crew, and buying a salmon troll permit seemed like a 
more feasible investment than halibut quota; “A lot of us [deckhands] just bought 
trollers.” One participant went to far as to claim that Pacific halibut IFQs had created the 
large troll fleet that exists today. 
 Additional effort is also placed on the troll fishery due to entry issues associated 
with the Pacific halibut fishing industry. It is extremely expensive to become a 
commercial halibut quota owner. As a result, many use salmon trolling as a way to build 
capital and a means to invest in halibut quota. Traditionally, halibut fishing has always 
been paired with salmon fishing in Sitka as a way to weather bad halibut years and short 
openings.  
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The balloon effects of the Pacific halibut IFQ program are not only felt in the 
salmon fishery. Those who were left out of the initial allocation scrambled to find ways 
to diversify their income. Some invested in quota, some left fishing behind, and some 
fled to other fisheries. It is recognized that the initial implementation of IFQs causes 
fishermen to flee to other fisheries. However, the literature focuses on the psychological 
impact IFQ implementation had on this behavior. According to Bromley and Macinko 
(2007), IFQ programs are intended to solve the derby fishery, but fishermen carry this 
mindset into other fisheries.224 Out of fear of IFQ implementation in other fisheries 
people begin the “race for history” in other open-access fisheries in anticipation of 
rationalization.225 This is essentially the same speculative fishing behavior that was 
exhibited in the Pacific halibut fishery when discussions of IFQs first began. 
 In conclusion, one of the unintended consequences of the Pacific halibut IFQ 
program was the ballooning of effort away from halibut and onto other commercial 
fishery stocks. This is a prevailing issue that needs to be addressed in current and future 
management. Acknowledgment is crucial because the balloon effects discussed will only 
be intensified by the increasing barriers to entry in the halibut fishery, decreased stock 
abundances, and climate change. 
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BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
 
One of the biggest problems facing the Pacific halibut fishery is the greying of the 
fleet. Greying of the fleet has resulted from low rates of turnover, entry, and investment 
in the fishery. We speculate that this is due to the high cost of entry into the fishery and 
the risk associated with investing. Halibut quota has almost reached $70 per pound, 
which can seem insurmountable as a young person trying to break into such a competitive 
fishery.226 Additionally, once the investment is made, it is not guaranteed to remain 
stable. Essentially you are investing in something that may evaporate, but the debt would 
remain.  
Many of the subjects that did not approve of the IFQ system or thought it had had 
a negative impact on their community, identified the high price of quota and barriers to 
entry as the reasons why. Several subjects stated that they couldn't make the investment 
‘pencil out,’ in other words the return on investment was not high enough to justify 
opportunity costs or to even just simply service the quota debt. Table 10 demonstrates It 
how the price of quota quickly outpaces the ex-vessel price. Ex-vessel price is the price 
per pound the captain receives at the dock (before other costs are subtracted). 
 Entry is one of the biggest failures of the Pacific halibut IFQ program and should 
serve as a significant deterrent for the consideration of future IFQ programs (table 10). 
 It seems as though solutions to entry are rare and carry their own set of controversial 
issues. However, there are a few viable options available to mature IFQ programs to 
                                                 
226 Sold Halibut IFQ Quota, 2C [Internet]. (AK): Alaskan Quota & Permits Broker, Alaska Quota & 
Permits LLC; 2019 [Cited 2019 Feb 18]. Available from 
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assist entrance, including a lease pool with proceeds used to compensate the transition of 
current quota holders from the industry. 
Year 
Number of New Entrants 
into the Pacific halibut IFQ 
Fishery in Area 2C 
Estimated 
Ex-Vessel 
Price 
Halibut Quota Price (mean 
price per pound of IFQ) 
 
1992 No IFQs $1.01 No IFQs 
1993 No IFQs $1.27 No IFQs 
1994 No IFQs $2.01 No IFQs 
1995 151 $2.04 $11.77 
1996 112 $2.26 $13.78 
1997 59 $2.24 $16.77 
1998 45 $1.39 $14.73 
1999 42 $1.99 No Data 
2000 57 $2.62 $11.27 
2001 43 $2.11 $12.32 
2002 42 $2.22 $11.80 
2003 47 $2.95 $12.56 
2004 34 $3.04 $17.17 
2005 28 $3.08 $21.89 
2006 29 $3.75 $21.64 
2007 25 $4.41 $22.40 
2008 12 $4.33 $28.48 
2009 12 $3.08 $22.22 
2010 22 $4.71 $24.66 
2011 10 $6.51 $34.12 
2012 15 $5.99 $37.35 
2013 17 $5.17 $42.13 
2014 21 $6.07 $44.29 
2015 16 $6.33 No Data 
2016 No Data $6.63 No Data 
2017 No Data $5.87 No Data 
Table 10: Count of new entrants into the Pacific halibut IFQ fishery in area 2C from the onset 
of the program to 2015.227 This can be compared with the rising ex-vessel prices ($/lb) and 
quota prices ($/lb). This data demonstrates ex-vessel prices both pre-IFQs (before 1995) and 
post-IFQs (1995-2017).228,229 
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EVASION OF OWNER ONBOARD 
 
Evasion of the owner on board requirement is a real concern in the current Pacific 
halibut fishery. One of the original intents of the owner on board safeguard was to keep 
the Pacific halibut fishery an owner-operated fleet. However, there are many loopholes 
and ways around this safeguar. 
Vessel investment and medical transfers represent the two most recent and biggest 
facilitators of evasion of the owner on board provision. In 1999, the Pacific halibut IFQ 
program was amended to allow the use of a hired skipper, so long as the quota holder had 
a 20% minimum investment in the catcher vessel.230 This means that as long as the quota 
holder makes the appropriate investment in the vessel, they never have to be on board 
while their quota is being fished. The 20% ownership provision is extended to non-
individual entities.231 Several subjects expressed that this amendment moved the fleet 
farther and farther from owner-operated. 
Medical transfers were added to the Pacific halibut IFQ program as an 
amendment in 2007.232 According to the proposed amendment, medical transfers were 
intended to alleviate financial burdens associated with not being able to fish quota as the 
result of injury.233 The injury may be personal, or that of a family member if it can be 
                                                 
Fisheries Service, 1-474; 2016 Dec [cited 2019 Feb 10]. Available from https://www.npfmc.org/wp-
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proven that the quota holders’ full-time care is necessary.234 Medical transfers may not be 
used if the quota holder is privy to other forms of leasing.235 There is no limit to the 
number of medical transfers one quota holder can receive.236 Numerous subjects 
expressed that they believe medical transfers are being abused. As long as the quota 
holder can fabricate multiple non-chronic, medical ailments, they can continue to receive 
medical transfers. Obviously, this is a skeptical view of the provision, and it is probably 
used responsibly in some cases. However, this concern is prevalent, and the validity of 
these assertions should be focused on in future research.  
Evasion of owner on board undermines the initial intent of the safeguard, and if 
one of the true goals of the Pacific halibut program was to retain an owner-operated fleet 
the success of the program needs to be re-evaluated. These loopholes remove any 
incentive to sell quota to the next generation. In 1995 Pacific halibut harvest by hired 
masters only constituted less than 15% of IFQ landings.237 However, this has increased 
considerably, and in 2014 hired masters harvested more than 40% of IFQ landings.238 
Future research should also focus on deterrents of hired masters, community impacts of 
hired masters, and provisions that could be implemented in future management schemes 
to prevent the negative impacts associated with evasion of owner on board. 
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MANIPULATION OF OWNERSHIP CAPS 
 
Many current participants are investing in multiple vessels rather than quota. 
Vessel owners can take out multiple quota holders and lease A-shares, providing that 
their vessel doesn't exceed the 1% cap. As indicated by numerous subjects, due to the 
outrageously high prices of quota, buying a vessel is cheaper than quota. As a result, 
manipulation of the ownership caps in this manner can actually be seen as having a 
positive impact on the fishery. Manipulation provides a means of entry and expands the 
fleet and the number of crew jobs available. Additionally, because the vessel owner 
doesn't have quota overhead, they can afford higher crew shares.  
 It was also argued that owning multiple vessels may serve as a solution to the 
number of out of state subjects by retaining more revenue in the state. Many vessels from 
Washington utilize what is referred to as the “Seattle Model”; the hired skipper’s vessels 
travel to Alaska, fish a vessel cap, and return back to Washington. Providing the same 
opportunities to these quota holders with vessels that fish out of Alaskan ports creates 
competition with Seattle based boats seeking to do the same. 
 Evasion of ownership caps by owning multiple vessels, but no quota is a new and 
upcoming trend in the Pacific halibut fishery. It is a behavior that has been normalized 
under the two-decade old IFQ system. Fishing in this manner may net more money than 
fishing and paying quota loans, but it is still only about 35% of the total revenue. What 
are the impacts of this normalized behavior and shifting norms concerning fishing 
practiced under IFQs? More research must also be done in order to understand negative 
and positive impacts evasion of ownership caps may be having on the fleet. 
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TRAWLING  
 
In the focus area of this study, Southeast Alaska, trawling is banned. Trawling 
was banned in this area in 1998.239 However, many subjects expressed concerns that the 
trawl ban could be overturned in the future. Trawling not only does irreparable harm to 
bottom habitat, but it is also extremely non-selective. Dragging the doors and net weights 
across the bottom pulverizes anything in its path, leaving behind a bottom that has been 
‘mowed.’ Even if bottom communities rebuild, the impacts are lasting. Collie, et al. 
(2005) found that fishing gear types that are dragged along the bottom greatly decrease 
megafauna diversity in both shallow and deep-water habitats.240 Bottom communities are 
also likely not allowed time to rebuild as trawling grounds are vast and fishing frequency 
is high. According to Amoroso, et al. (2018), the trawling footprint in the Gulf of Alaska 
is greater than 50%.241 In addition to the damage trawling causes to bottom communities, 
the gear is extremely non-selective. Although trawling is banned in Southeast Alaska, 
trawling in other areas has a huge impact on the Pacific halibut stock. Pacific halibut 
spawning grounds are scattered throughout the Gulf of Alaska, Bering Sea, and the 
Aleutian Islands, which are all heavily trawled areas.242 As a result bycatch of juvenile 
halibut can have a huge bottom-up effect on the directed fishery. According to Clark and 
Hare (2011), over 50% of the sub-legal Pacific halibut were taken in area 4, and mainly 
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by the Bering Sea trawl fleet.243 Because trawl nets are so large and non-selective the 
impacts of one mistake or one bad trawl could result in hundreds of pounds of bycatch. 
How are managers to be sure that they are accurately representing the juvenile halibut 
stock? How will bycatch from the undirected fishery impact the directed fishery? Due to 
the sheer volume of the trawl fleet, their incidental catch of juvenile halibut is often more 
individual fish than caught in the TAC for the directed fishery. 
 Many subjects advocated for a full trawl ban, stating that the halibut stock wasn't 
the only one taking a hit, but the negative impacts could also be seen in the sablefish and 
salmon stocks. Overall, 42% of subjects discussed trawling in their interviews and of 
those that discussed it, 100% saw it as negatively impacting the Pacific halibut fleet. 
 Although trawling in Southeast Alaska was banned in 1998, the impacts from 
trawling are still felt in the area. A full trawl ban would be extremely difficult to 
implement due to the increasing global demand for food and the sheer volume of protein 
that is harvested in trawl fisheries. However, trawl fisheries should be held to a higher 
standard for selectivity and bycatch. Bycatch levels should be lowered and treated as 
choke species in order to incentivize better fishing practices. Additionally, more research 
should focus on juvenile halibut stocks, recruitment, and the overall direct and indirect 
impacts trawling is having on other fisheries. 
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THE CHARTER FLEET 
 
The charter or guided sportfish industry has been rapidly growing in Southeast 
Alaska. As the charter fleet grew, management struggled to keep up, resulting in loose 
management for several years. Overall, the management of the Pacific halibut charter 
fleet has undergone many recent changes in response to overexploitation in this sector.  
In 2003, guideline harvest levels (GHLs) were established for the charter fleet in 
areas 2C and 3A.244 GHL levels were set by NPFMC, but were not a hard cap.245 Instead, 
they were just a benchmark.246 In area 2C, the charter fleet exceeded these GHLs every 
year from 2004-2010.247 Additionally, although decreases in the halibut stock have 
resulted in the lowering of GHLs and the commercial TAC, over recent years, the 
percentage of the total catch taken by the charter fleet increased.248 This is termed by 
commercial fishermen as a reallocation to the charter fleet. Originally, the charter fleet 
catch was subtracted before the commercial catch was established, but now they are done 
at the same time.249 In other words, increasing reallocation to the charter fleet directly 
pulls quota from the commercial pool.  
Several subjects expressed concern regarding the reallocation to the charter fleet. 
This is an extremely relevant, current, and controversial issue in the town of Sitka. Many 
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fishermen feel as though it is unfair that the reallocation has decreased the commercial 
TAC and devalued their quota, while people struggle to buy into the commercial fleet or 
service large quota loans. They also feel that it is unfair that the commercial sector 
continues to take larger cuts, while the percentage allocated to charter fishermen 
increases. Finally, numerous subjects felt that the charter fleet has had a negative impact 
on the stock all of the years they fished beyond the GHL.  
 While this research was being conducted there was another major change in 
Pacific halibut charter fleet management. In September 2018 the charter industry was 
approved to form a recreational quota entity (RQE) that can participate in the Pacific 
halibut and sablefish IFQ program in areas 2C and 3A.250 The RQE is an entity that 
charter fishermen can use to pool money in order to purchase quota to augment their 
allocation.251 In area 2C the RQE is limited to purchasing no more than 1% of the 
commercial quota shares in a single year and cannot exceed 10% of the total commercial 
quota in the area.252 There were mixed opinions among subjects concerning this 
proposal. Some felt it was good that they had to pay for quota rather than receiving it for 
free via reallocation efforts. Others felt that the additional competition on the quota 
market would further drive up quota prices, making them completely inaccessible to 
single individuals. Charter fishermen have the potential to “sell fish twice” according to 
one subject; they can sell access to the fish, the experience of fishing, and they can sell 
                                                 
250 15 C.F.R. § 902 2018, and 50 C.F.R. § 300, 679 2018. 
251 I.d. 
252 NOAA Proposes Compensated Reallocation Program between Halibut Commercial and Charter Sectors 
[Internet]. Anchorage and Juneau (AK): NOAA Fisheries Alaska Regional Office. 2017 Oct [cited Feb 21]. 
Available from alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/node/56970 
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the actual fish. Some stated that the charter fleet owning quota would negatively impact 
the processors. Charters process their own fish to send home with clients or to keep 
themselves, so using quota to do this decreases the amount of halibut entering processing 
plants.  
 Allowing an RQE to purchase quota is a massive change to an IFQ system that 
introduces new competition into the quota market. It is unclear how this competition is 
going to impact the market, entrance into the commercial fleet, and the welfare of the 
commercial fleet in general. As a result, future research should follow the development 
of this new provision to measure the impact it has on the IFQ program and its viability 
for future generations. 
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CHANGE RIDDEN FUTURE 
 
Beyond IFQs, fishermen are becoming increasingly concerned with the state of 
the halibut resource and how it may be impacted by a changing ocean in the future. 
Fishermen are worried and unsure about how halibut stocks will respond to excessive 
juvenile bycatch, warming ocean temperatures, changing ocean currents, changing ocean 
pH, increased pollution, etc. Some fishermen were also worried that climate change and 
decreasing stocks would devalue the quota they have invested in. Overwhelming, 
however, those who discussed climate change expressed that it was the biggest problem 
facing the industry, far bigger than IFQs: 
“I mean I’m more concerned about what’s happening to the ocean than this 
quota program because then they are probably affected. Why aren't these 
small fish growing as fast? Is that hormones in the ocean, is it the use of 
detergents, I mean is it fertilizers on land, is it overfishing? There’re all of 
these plausible scenarios in my mind, which could have some effect. And 
then you combine them all together and you've got a system where I wonder 
if you're going to be able to commercial harvest in 20 years.” 
 
Fishermen should be considered an untapped, wealth of knowledge concerning ocean 
change because many have been fishing the same grounds for decades or over numerous 
family generations and have invaluable observations concerning changes in 
environmental patterns. One fisherman stated that they would like to bridge that gap 
between scientists and fishermen to allow for an easier flow of information. Currently, 
they are using a social media group as a platform to start this change. It is the opinion of 
this research that more resources should be focused on studying climate change 
progression, impact, and solutions. All of the fisheries-related issues in this paper are 
important, but irrelevant if the fishery ceases to exist in the near future.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study aimed to present contemporary, modern-day opinions concerning the 
impacts of Pacific Halibut IFQs, determine the effectiveness of the management 
safeguards, identify improvements to the safeguards, and pose management alternatives 
to IFQs. The large majority of those that participated in this study preferred IFQs and 
found the safeguards to be successful in accomplishing their goals. However, it seemed 
that preference and positivity towards the IFQ system were linked to the subject’s role in 
the community, fishery, and the initial allocation process. Regardless of demographics, 
the majority of subjects felt that the program had had an adverse impact on their 
community. Interestingly enough, many who thought the program had negatively 
impacted their community, believed it had positively impacted them individually. This 
suggests a discrepancy in the scale and level of impact IFQs can have. There was 
overwhelming support for the safeguards from all subjects regardless of demographics. 
The safeguards transformed the Pacific halibut IFQ program from something that would 
have been unsustainable, to something that is manageable and has become integrated into 
Alaskan communities. This integration is of course not without conflict and division of 
these tight-knit communities. The Pacific halibut IFQ program certainly would have been 
a momentous failure in many different aspects without these encompassing safeguards. 
Nevertheless, in a system whose aim is to manage the actions of human beings, there are 
always loopholes and new problems that arise as time passes and environments change. 
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In addition to these objectives, relevant issues outside of these realms were 
identified through in-depth conversations with participants. It is important as researchers 
to understand and be able to identify when new issues arise outside the sphere of the 
intended research questions. It is a great responsibility to be trusted to tell the stories of 
the fishermen who participated in this study. As such, it is extremely important to convey 
the arising issues that fishermen see as important. This is an essential step to close the gap 
between researcher and industry. As a result, this research expanded to include current 
issues including IFQ balloon effects, barriers to entry, evasion of safeguards, trawling, 
charter fleet reallocation, and climate change. It is the recommendation of this research 
that future studies focus on these areas, specifically, the cross section of these social 
phenomena, fields of hard science, and management practices. Studies should be 
inclusive to various demographics and have a high level of community involvement. It is 
our strong belief that this study yielded highly reliable and authentic results because of 
the trust gained through fostering relationships that were created by living and being part 
of a community. 
 It can be concluded that in general the Pacific halibut IFQ program thus far has 
been successful. This is attributed to the unique situation facing fishermen before IFQs 
were implemented. The halibut derbies were unlike anything other systems in modern 
fisheries have experienced and this should be taken into account when using the Pacific 
halibut IFQ program as a model for future management. There are several alternatives 
that lack the social consequences of IFQs and can accomplish similar goals of restricting 
effort and sustaining catch and biomass. The stories told by fishermen in this research 
should serve as cautionary tales to managers around the world that are heading towards 
  104 
transitional periods. Even with the encompassing safeguards put in place, certain issues 
and social trauma cannot be avoided with a system that essentially selects winners and 
losers. All other appropriate management alternatives should be examined before 
considering privatizing a resource. This makes access to the resource more feasible for a 
larger portion of the population, while allowing fishing traditions to continue through 
generations. 
Pacific Halibut is an incredibly important resource both economically and 
culturally to the people of Alaska. Improper management could not only result in the loss 
of a resource, but also the loss of a way of life for Alaskans. In conclusion, it is important 
to understand the implications of management schemes and look for ways to incorporate 
local knowledge and suggestions for improvement. There are no better people to ask than 
those who depend on, are culturally tied to, and have an innumerable passion for the 
resource.
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 – SAMPLE QUESTIONS 
 
1. Are you a Pacific Halibut fisherman or previous fisherman?  
2. Are you an Alaskan Native or part of the Tlingit Tribe? 
3. What is your connection to the Pacific halibut fishery? 
4. What class is/was your vessel? 
5. How much quota were you initially allocated if any? 
6. How much quota do you have now (did you buy, sell)? 
7. What fisheries do you participate in? 
8. Do you fish for subsistence or to provide a livelihood? 
9. Do you feel IFQs have changed your life since their implementation? Has this 
opinion changed over time? 
 
10. Do you believe IFQs have impacted your community? If so, in what ways? 
11. Would you prefer the current IFQ system or an alternate method to IFQs? Why 
and what would you suggest? 
 
12. Do you feel the five safeguards/restrictions unique to this program are 
effective in accomplishing their individual goals? 
a. Quota shareholders must be on board (owner-operator clause). 
b. Blocked holdings- smaller quota shares, less than 20,000 lbs., could not be 
consolidated with other permits. 
c. Only quota share recipients or crewmembers with 150 days of experience 
in a U.S. fishery may buy quota. 
d. Total landings of any vessel may not exceed ½% of the TAC in area 2C. 
No more than 0.5% of the TAC in area 2C per shareholder.  
e. Quota can only be fished down vessel class and not up. 
 
13. How could the current safeguards in the Pacific Halibut fishery be changed, 
modified, or improved? 
14. What does Pacific halibut fishing mean to you personally?  
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